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Since the appearance of the Wealth of Nations,
economists have had a great deal to learn, and since the
poverty of nations has become a major concern for the whole
world, economists have even more to learn. Soon after the
Second World War, economists began to be increasingly aware
of the economic distance between nations. The war against
poverty can no longer be neglected when
. . . in the century following i860 the share of world
income of the quarter of the world's population living 
in the world's richest countries increased from 58 per­
cent to 72 percent. . . .^
Unfortunately, the concern with the problem of under­
development still has not produced any significant narrowing 
of the gap between the rich and the poor countries in this 
Third Development Decade, i.e., 1971-1980. Economists have 
yet to agree either about the mainsprings of economic develop­
ment or the constraints on it, despite nearly three decades 
of study and experience on the subject.
A superficial but very popular view at one time was 
that capital is a panacea to underdevelopment— if applied 
large enough, injections of capital alone will be sufficient
1
2to induce economic development. This "capital is every­
thing" approach assumes that increases in domestic capital 
stock are able to account for all the increases in a coun­
try's gross national product. That is, if historically each 
extra dollar of output was associated with three dollars of 
extra domestic investment, then $3X of further additional 
"capital" from abroad would somehow generate a further SX 
of gross national product.
This approach unfortunately does not take into con­
sideration the absorptive capacity of the grant recipient 
country. For example, the availability of skilled labor 
capable of managing any additional modern capital equipment 
and the existence of effective demand for the output gener­
ated by the additional capital investment, etc., are 
neglected. The fact that the target rates of development 
set for fulfillment in the First Development Decade, i.e., 
1951-1960, were not attained in many countries, despite huge 
amounts of international aid given to these countries, inevi­
tably forced development economists to take a new look at 
their strategic tools again.
The concept of human capital was then evolved.
During the mid-sixties, people began to realize that invest­
ment in human capital could produce as high an implicit 
return as investment in physical capital. It was thought 
that the true costs of education were a profitable investment 
for an individual, his family and the government. As 
Harberger puts it:
The key . . .  is to recognize that education is an 
investment. . . . Economic considerations influence
not only the general nature of investments but also 
the detailed ways in which they are carried out. . . .
a really serious effort to understand the economic 
consequences of different detailed types and classes 
of investment in education would help greatly to 
improve the contribution that education can make to 
economic progress.^
Notwithstanding the emphasis given to capital, 
physical and human, as a factor in economic development, 
it is disappointing that a very closely related area--the 
monetary and financial aspect of economic development--has 
not adequately been explored. This may be due to either one 
or both of the following reasons.
First , money is not assumed to be a limiting factor 
in economic development by many policy makers. This view 
has already been deeply rooted in western economic theories. 
In traditional economic theory, money is regarded as a pas­
sive variable, the supply of which is infinitely elastic. 
Money is relatively costless to produce, as it does not 
absorb any real resources in significant amounts. Thus,
money can always be controlled to satisfy the requirements
3
of the real variables of the economic system.
Secondly, there are some analytical grounds for
neglecting the financial aspect of development. According
to Chandavarkar:
. . . apart from the notorious intricacy of theory
about it, the chief obstacle to insinuating money 
into secular growth models is that to do so one must 
make a dynamic assumption about the way it develops 
as an institution. . . .^
4No nialtef what the traditional theory advocates and 
the fact that economic development depends ultimately on 
real factors should not preclude consideration that money 
and finance are important and relevant in the development 
process. Money matters to development, though not in the 
sense as food, energy or technology. It is this general 
issue that the present dissertation attempts to analyze.
Various attempts to establish a causal relationship 
between financial and economic development have not led to 
any definitive conclusions. For instance, Patrick came up 
with two terms that purport to describe the causation 
phenomenon, namely "supply leading" and "demand following."^ 
The former describes the phenomenon that the creation of 
financial institutions and the supply of financial services 
are in advance of the demand for them, thereby leading the 
economy to develop. "Demand following" is the phenomenon 
in which the creation of financial institutions and their 
services is in response to the demand for them and it is 
development in the real sector that leads the financial 
sector to develop. Cameron has attempted to tackle this 
problem by a comparative-historical approach.^ Unfor­
tunately his study did not draw any positive conclusion on 
the causal relationship between finance and economic develop­
ment. He found that in some countries, finance is "demand 
following" while in others, finance leads.
5Since the causal problem has been studied extensively 
and the results have proved to be inconclusive, no attempt 
is made in this dissertation to follow up this topic. In 
fact, I concur with Chandavarkar's view that the causal links 
are not as important as the adoption of appropriate policies
7
in developing the financial sector. Thus, no matter what 
the causal relationship is, it is assumed that money matters 
and that we should know more about the financial sector, 
its development and measurement, during the process of eco­
nomic development.
Therefore, it is the primary purpose of this study 
to explore the measurement of financial development and the 
assumed association between financial and economic develop­
ment. Past efforts to measure financial development include 
the introduction of two ratios. They were proposed by
g
U Tun Wai. It will be our attempt to formulate a third 
ratio which we believe to be a more comprehensive and a 
better measurement of financial development. To explore 
the association between financial and economic development 
and to delve into the measurement of financial development 
a number of tests will be made.
To provide the necessary background. Chapter II 
gives a review of the literature concerning finance and 
economic development. The Keynesian Liquidity Preference 
theory and the Neoclassical theory are discussed in 
greater detail, followed by an exposition of McKinnon's New
6View on money and development. McKinnon's model is 
regarded as more appropriate to the developing world than 
the Keynesian or Neoclassical models.
Chapter III points out some of the characteristics 
of the financial markets in less developed countries-- 
characteristics which are often ignored by orthodox Western 
economic theories. The two financial ratios used by Wai 
will then be presented followed by the formulation of the 
third, new one.
Chapter IV presents the methodology and the results 
of the tests of the various hypotheses. Several case studies 
will also be presented in order to strengthen the argument 
that the new ratio is a better indicator of financial develop­
ment than the others.
Finally, in Chapter V we present a summary and con­
clusions of this study.
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
As mentioned in the previous chapter, it is only 
recently that economists started to investigate the rela­
tionship between financial and economic development. Frag­
mentary propositions on the behavior of the financial sector 
with respect to development have appeared occasionally in 
the literature and most of them have been confined to theo­
retical or inferential propositions. This chapter gives a 
brief summary of the literature that is directly related to 
the topic under study.
Whittlesey
Charles R. Whittlesey distinguished three positions 
with respect to the relationship between the quantity of
9
money and the rate of economic growth. The first posi­
tion, which is more or less the traditional quantity theory, 
states that an increase in the quantity of money is a suffi­
cient condition for economic growth. The second position is 
that an increase in the quantity of money is a necessary, 
but not sufficient, condition for economic growth. Money 
in this case is a permissive rather than a causal factor 
for economic growth. Finally, there is the position that
7
8the money supply adapts automatically to the growth 
process, i.e., money is passive. According to Whittlesey, 
these three positions are not mutually exclusive.
The differences between these points of view are 
perhaps not as sharp as may seem to be implied. Those 
who say that the quantity of money has in fact adjusted 
to a rise in economic activity do not necessarily deny, 
and may specifically state, that restriction of the 
supply of money, if actually effected and carried far 
enough, would indeed restrain economic expansion.
Whittlesey did not specify explicitly which posi­
tion he holds concerning the role of money in economic 
g r o w t h . H o w e v e r ,  from his sincere belief that monetary 
policy should take as one of its objectives the promotion 
of economic growth, we can infer that he belongs to the 
first position--namely, that money is a sufficient condi­
tion for growth.
Patrick
A somewhat similar approach to Whittlesey's in classi­
fying the role of money in economic growth is given by Hugh T.
12Patrick. In discussing the causal relationship between 
financial development and economic growth, he distinguishes 
between two phenomena, "demand-following" and "supply- 
leading."
. . . "demand-following" is the phenomenon in which
the creation of modern financial institutions, their 
financial assets and liabilities, and related financial 
services is in response to the demand for these services 
by investors and savers in the real economy. . . .
. . . "supply-leading" phenomenon is the creation of
financial institutions and the supply of their financial
assets , liabilities , and related financial services 
in advance of demand for them, especially the demand 
of entrepreneurs in the modern, growth-inducing sec­
tors. . .
The "demand-following" phenomenon corresponds closely 
to Whittlesey's second and third positions that money is 
permissive and passive in the growth process. On the other 
hand, the "supply-leading" phenomenon suggests that money, 
though it may not be a necessary condition, is quite suffi­
cient for launching self-sustained economic growth. Patrick 
postulates that, in general, during the process of develop­
ment, the "supply-leading" phenomenon may take place first 
and then gradually be replaced by "demand-following" finance. 
"Supply-leading" finance implies that the financial institu­
tions, their assets, and services are created in advance of 
the demand for them. The availability of newly created 
"supply-leading" funds may encourage the entrepreneurs to 
"think big." At the same time
. . . the banks would be in a position to supply not
only credit and capital, but also entrepreneurial super­
vision and guidance, and to coordinate the production 
and financial planning of several related industries.
As real growth occurs, the demand for money for transaction
balances increases. Simultaneously, as real per capita
income rises, the demand for money for precautionary and
speculative purposes also increases. Thus, the "supply-
leading" phenomenon will gradually fade away and it will be
replaced by "demand-following" finance.
10
Patrick's postulate on the relationship between 
financial and economic development is among the best in 
the literature, as it synthesizes the two opposite views on 
the causation of finance and economic development. Unfor­
tunately, he did not substantiate his hypothesis by empirical 
evidence or statistical analysis.
Cameron
A comparative-historical approach to the subject of 
banking and economic development was used by Rondo Cameron 
and his group in two extensively researched studies.
This approach is based on the premise that historical experi­
ence is relevant to the problems of the contemporary world 
and developing countries today can learn from the experience 
of the now-developed nations. In his earlier book, Cameron 
made a comparative study of the role of banking in economic 
development by looking at the first five European newcomers 
to industrialization--namely England, Scotland, France, 
Belgium and Germany--as well as two late-comers to indus­
trialization-- Japan and Russia. He concludes that there 
does not exist any universal banking system which is appro­
priate for all economies. Cameron's "structural-functional" 
theory of the role of banking in economic development sug­
gests that the structural characteristics of a banking 
system--the laws, the regulations and customs that govern 
its behavior--are normally more important than, say, the
11
qualities of the bankers in determining the system's suc­
cess in its role to development. He concluded that:
. . . where banking was left most free to develop in
response to the demand for its services, it produced 
the best results. Restrictions on freedom of entry 
almost always reduce the quantity and quality of 
financial services available to the economy, and 
thus hinder or distort economic growth. Competition 
in banking, on the other hand, acts as a spur to the 
mobilization of idle financial resources and to their^^ 
efficient utilization in commerce and industry. . . .
In his second book on banking and economic develop­
ment , Cameron examined the role of banking in four European
countries which either failed to or were slow in industri-
17alizing during the nineteenth century. These countries 
are: Austria, Italy, Spain and Serbia. The result of
this study seems to substantiate Cameron's earlier conclu­
sion in his first book.
Although Cameron managed to touch on the quantita­
tive aspect of financial structure, a major part of his 
study is descriptive and comparative. He proposed and investi­
gated three indicators of financial structure, namely density, 
the relative size of the banking sector and the size and con­
centration of bank power. According to him, the density of 
financial institutions is significant, primarily in terms 
of their accessibility, but it also has an important bearing 
on the degree of competition in banking. Cameron used the 
number of bank offices per ten thousand people as a rough 
measure of density. The ratio of bank assets to national 
income was used as an indicator of the relative size of the
12
banking sector. Basing his research upon the countries 
studied, Cameron concluded that, basically, the countries 
with the highest ratios at the end of the period investi­
gated were also the ones that experienced the most rapid 
spurts of industrialization.
Cameron's two studies were limited to only a few 
countries and the conclusion he arrived at, based on the 
indicators he used, were not supported by rigorous statisti­
cal tests. Nevertheless, the comparative-historical approach 
seems to be a useful methodology in the study of economic 
development.
Chandavarkar
A more policy-oriented view on the relationship
between finance and development is stressed by an Interna-
J.8tional Monetary Fund official, Anand Chandavarkar. He 
takes a somewhat different approach from that of Whittlesey 
or Patrick. His basic position is that finance is relevant 
for development, but the ". . . causal links are not so
much through the number and variety of financial institu­
tions and instruments as in the adoption of appropriate 
policies [italics are the present a u t h o r O f f i c i a l  
authorities and bankers in the less developed countries are 
trying to expand the availability of banking facilities to 
the neglected communities on the one hand, while on the 
other, there exists a restrictive attitude towards the 
pricing of both inputs and outputs of the banking industry.
13
Usually, there are "ceilings" on interest rates given to 
deposits as well as "floors" on loan rates--all of which 
are results of the semi-monopolistic nature of the banking 
industry. At the same time, the inefficient practice on the 
part of the banks, of insisting upon collateral on loans, 
restricts the availability of credit in many less developed 
countries. Hence, according to Chandavarkar, liberalization 
of the financial structure, exposure of deposits and loans 
to market forces of supply and demand, and the restoration 
of lending attitudes, techniques and procedures away from 
the traditional preoccupation with collateral are what we 
should be concerned with, rather than investigating whether 
financial intermediation is a "demand-following" or "supply- 
leading" phenomenon. In essence, Chandavarkar is more con­
cerned about the relevant policy for achieving a viable 
financial atmosphere for economic development than the causal 
link underlying money and economic development.
U Tun Wai
Some pioneering work on unorganized money markets
in less developed countries was done by U Tun Wai of the
20International Monetary Fund. In addition to analyzing 
the nature of the unorganized money markets in the less 
developed countries , Wai also conducted in-depth field 
studies and estimated the interest rates in several unor­
ganized Asian money markets. Wai found that most of the
14
loans from the unorganized money markets are for financing 
consumer expenditures which are unlikely to be able to stimu­
late economic growth. High rates of interest prevail in 
unorganized money markets because of the economic and social 
conditions, as well as supply and demand, in the less devel­
oped countries. The unorganized market is larger in size 
than the organized money market in many less developed coun­
tries and they do not have much connection between each 
other. Consequently, orthodox monetary policy, as an instru­
ment for economic stability and growth, has very limited use. 
Authorities should, therefore, concentrate on narrowing the 
gap between the two markets; thereby widening the scope for 
monetary policy.
Wai used the ratio of deposit money to money supply 
and the ratio of the banking system's claims on the private 
sector to national income as indicators of the size of orga­
nized money markets in less developed countries. He com­
puted:
(1) the deposit ratio for five developed and thirty- 
one developing countries, periodically between 
1913 and 1953; and
(2) the claim ratio for fifteen developed and 
twenty-two developing countries in 1938 and 
from 1948 to 1953.
Wai's results broadly confirm that both ratios might be 
expected to be low in an underdeveloped country and high in
15
a developed one. However, Wai pointed out that the deposit 
ratio may be misleading in estimating the size of the money 
market ;
. . . For example, this ratio is almost as high in some
of the Latin American countries as in the most highly 
developed countries, A possible explanation may be 
that while the money markets are fairly large in some 
Latin American countries, they may not be functioning 
as efficiently as in the more developed countries.^
Despite recognizing the importance of efficiency in
a money market, Wai did not go any further in this direction.
It is from here that we shall follow up and construct an
efficiency measurement to see if it can be a better indicator
of development than the deposit and claim ratios.
Kurosaki
According to Hideo Kurosaki, the financial market
in the less developed countries is: (1) dominated by
foreign banks; (2) has a dual interest rate structure; and
22(3 ) has a seasonal characteristic. Before a less devel­
oped country starts to develop financially, foreign banks 
contribute to the modernization of finance by establishing 
organized money markets. However, as a country begins to 
develop, foreign banks may turn out to be a vice. Foreign 
banks are usually exchange banks that deal in the finance 
of trade and .commerce. To the extent that many less devel­
oped countries are still primarily producers engaged in 
agriculture, the exchange banks' main line of business is 
to finance exports of primary products in foreign trade.
l6
The kind of finance which the less developed countries 
urgently need at this stage, however, is finance for produc­
tion and industry, instead of that of trade and commerce. 
Hence, a conflict of interest exists between the foreign 
banks and the developing countries. Moreover, as the orga­
nized money market can be broadened through expansion of the 
availability of banking services to rural areas, it may be 
unrealistic to expect the foreign banks to shoulder this 
responsibility. It simply does not pay off for them to 
spread into rural areas which seldom need the service of 
trade finance. It is not that less developed countries 
should eliminate foreign banks, but according to Kurosaki, 
national banks should play a more important role in improving 
the financial structure of these countries. Commercial 
banks, on the other hand, may be too young to fill the gap 
of the foreign banks.
It is well known that organized and unorganized 
money markets co-exist in the less developed countries. 
Interest rates charged by money lenders in the unorganized 
markets are usually much higher than that in the organized 
markets. Thus a dual interest rate structure exists in 
the financial market of the less developed countries.
Most of the less developed countries are producers 
of agricultural products. During harvest season, more money 
is needed to pay off the temporary workers who help in the 
field or extra credit is needed for getting the primary
17
products ready for export. Thus, activities in the finan­
cial markets may be more dynamic in the harvest season; 
and it is only natural that the financial markets in less 
developed countries have a seasonal characteristic.
Adelman and Morris
Adelman and Morris approached the problem of measuring 
economic development through integrated econometric models
of socioeconomic and political change in developing coun-
23tries. Two variables for indicating the degree of 
improvement in financial institutions were used--the change 
in the degree of industrialization and the extent of dualism. 
These variables were vaguely defined as:
The first variable, the indicator of the change in 
the degree of industrialization reflects the positive 
impact on financial organization of the increases in 
the demand for credit that characteristically accom­
pany the expansion of the industrial sector.
The inclusion of the indicator of the degree of 
dualism, the second variable in the financial equa­
tion, depicts the parallel importance for improving 
financial institutions of expansions in the demand 
for credit caused by the generalization of growth out­
side the urban-industrial complex.
In another model, the level of effectiveness of 
financial institutions and the degree of improvement in
25
financial institutions were used as financial indicators.
The former index includes two statistical measures of the 
flow of internal savings through a country's financial system 
and a judgmental classification variable. The gross domestic 
savings rate and the ratio of the sum of time and demand
18
deposits, plus money to gross national income, were used 
for the above statistical measures.
Adelman and Morris recognized the importance of 
considering both the borrowing and lending part of finance. 
However, they failed to show explicitly how their indicators 
on financial development were constructed. The vaguely 
defined "judgmental classification variable" seems to be 
highly subjective. Nevertheless, their results reveal that 
each indicator— the level of effectiveness and the degree 
of improvement of financial institutions--alone can explain 
about sixty percent of the difference in the rate of growth 
of real per capita gross national product.
Wallich
Wallich attempts to relate economic growth to a 
variety of monetary variables in his study, "Money and 
Growth, A Cross-Section A n a l y s i s . T h e  variables that 
are of interest to us include:
(1) The asset structure of the monetary system which
is measured by the claims on the public sector 
as a ratio of total assets of the monetary 
system--combining central bank and commercial 
banks and stated gross of foreign liabilities. 
This variable reflects the policies of the government that 
may influence growth. Assuming that full employment can
be maintained by an appropriate monetary policy and an
appropriate level of government expenditures' budget, given
19
a fixed amount of expenditure a government can contribute 
to growth by running a surplus or at least by abstaining 
from borrowing. If such surplus or balanced budget policy 
is carried out long enough, a low level of public debt 
holdings within the monetary system may result. Moreover, 
in developing countries, a banking system whose principal 
assets are composed of claims on the public sector may not 
be viewed with confidence. It may be regarded as inflation- 
prone or may be easily frozen by political turmoil and, 
hence, tend to retard growth. Wallich hypothesized that 
holdings of government securities are negatively related 
to growth.
(2) The degree of intermediation given by the lia­
bilities of the monetary system in relation to 
income is a variable which is broadly regarded 
as a proxy for the degree of financial develop­
ment ; and
(3) the rate of monetary growth and its variability.
To test the hypothesis that holdings of government
securities are negatively related to growth, Wallich regressed 
the annual growth rate of gross national product on
(i) claims on the public sector as a ratio of total 
assets of the monetary system, and
(ii) per capita gross national product and annual 
population growth rate.
20
The result broadly confirms his hypotheses, implying that 
the governments in the countries under study tend to finance 
expenditures from borrowing instead of from taxes.
To analyze the relationship between intermediation 
and growth, Wallich regressed the annual growth rate on 
(i) total money supply (the broad definition of 
money) as a ratio of gross national product,
(ii) per capita gross national product, and
(iii) rate of growth of the population.
As expected, the result shows that the degree of intermedia­
tion is positively related to growth.
Instead of regressing economic growth rate on the 
rate of growth of money, Wallich added in a "squared term" 
on the money growth rate. His results reveal that the rate 
of growth of money supply is nonlinearly related to growth.
The significance of this empirical analysis seems 
to be doubtful. As Wallich recognized the problem explicitly, 
pooling developed and less developed countries together in 
the regression analyses, will highly increase the signifi­
cance of the result. His justification for doing so--that 
an economy is an economy is an economy--is only arbitrary 
and we may anticipate the significance of his results might 




One of the pioneering works in the area of finan­
cial and economic development is Goldsmith’s lengthy and
27thought-provoking book. This may be the only existing
study on the topic which is both theoretical as well as 
empirical. The model he develops consists of twenty-five 
ratios, of which the financial interrelations' ratio is the 
most important. Goldsmith used the financial interrelations' 
ratio--the value of all financial instruments outstanding, 
divided by the value of national wealth--as the main single 
characteristic of the level of a country's financial devel­
opment .
The level and movement of the financial interrela­
tions ratio . . . reflect the extent to which the 
groups of economic units that habitually account for 
the bulk of capital expenditures or occasionally incur 
current expenditures in excess of income--business 
enterprises, home owners, and government--need to resort 
to external financing through borrowing or through issu­
ance of equity securities, or are able to finance their„ 
expenditures internally out of their own saving. . . .
In the empirical investigation. Goldsmith first 
selected thirty-five countries and made a cross-section 
analysis of their financial interrelations' ratio in 19^3 
by correlating the ratio with per capita real GNP. His 
result
. . . permits us to draw both positive and negative
conclusions on the relationship between the finan­
cial interrelations ratio and the stage of economic 
development as far as it is reflected in GNP per head 
at purchasing power equivalents. . . .^9
22
Goldsmith's first conclusion, which is positive, is that 
at the present time developed countries do indeed have a 
higher financial interrelations' ratio than do developing 
countries. Unfortunately, the second conclusion suggested 
that the association between the financial interrelations' 
ratio and per capita real GNP, though present, is only a 
loose and irregular one.
Goldsmith then computed the trend of the financial
interrelations' ratio in four developed countries--Great
Britain, United States, Germany and Japan--from i860 to
1963. He concluded that
. . . even in the long run there is no close corre­
lation between the rate of growth of real national 
product and of financial interrelations' ratio, 
although again some positive association between 
the two magnitudes cannot be denied.
Despite the ambiguous empirical results concerning 
the correlation between the rate of growth of real CNF and 
the financial interrelations' ratio. Goldsmith asserts 
that :
The financial superstructure, in the form of both 
primary and secondary securities, accelerates eco­
nomic growth and improves economic performance to the 
extent that it facilitates the migration of funds to 
the best user, i.e. to the place in the economic 
system where the funds will yield the highest social 
return.
A major criticism of Goldsmith's cross-section 
analysis is that he did not have a comprehensive sample of 
the developing countries in his sample. Of the thirty-five 
countries he covered, only fifteen were developing
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countries. If we isolate the developing countries and use 
a larger sample, the result may reveal a clearer picture. 
With regard to the trend analysis, both the United States 
and Japan did show a remarkable increasing trend in the 
period studied. The irregular movement in the British and 
German financial interrelations' ratio may be accounted for 
by historical events. Again, if we analyze the financial 
interrelations' ratio of developing countries after the 
Second World War, we may encounter more significant results.
Gurley
John G. Gurley may be among the first economists
to relate financial structure to economic development. In
his Rehovoth Conference paper presented in Jerusalem in
1965 he analyzed the relationship between gross national
product per capita and the financial ratio which he defined
3 2as the ratio of total financial assets to GNP. His 
cross-section study on seventy countries, between 1953 and 
1961, showed that, in general, time and savings deposits 
tend to grow relative to GNP as per capita GNP rises. The 
deposits Gurley used were time and savings deposits in com­
mercial banks, postal savings banks and other intermediaries 
He also showed that, in general, countries will follow a 
rising financial path which increases at a decreasing rate 
in the process of development. However, ". . . the paths
may be quite different for different countries, depending
2k
on the resources allocated to the alternative techniques
33for mobilizing the economic surplus." Thus, a centrally 
planned economy, for example, may have a lower financial 
ratio than that of a much poorer country that is just starting 
out on a financial path with a higher initial financial ratio.
Gurley's paper does provide a theoretical framework 
on the study of financial structure and development. He 
was over-concerned with quasi-money and overlooked the fact 
that demand deposits occupy a major portion in the money 
supply also. His proposition that different countries may 
follow different financial paths, may account for the imper­
fect correlation between financial ratio and development.
John M. Keynes
The ideas of Keynes played an important part in
shaping contemporary theories of economics. Our survey of
the literature would not be complete without incorporating
relevant parts of the economic theory of Keynes.
Let us start with the phenomena affecting the shape
of the liquidity curve. As a point of departure, we can
take the motives underlying the desire to hold money. Keynes
stated that there are three reasons why people want to hold
money: the transactions motive, the precautionary motive
3kand the speculative motive. We shall deal with each of 
these motives one by one.
There are two major factors affecting the demand 
for money for transaction purposes in less developed
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countries. On the one hand, there is no reason to assume 
that the role played by the transaction motive should be 
different in less developed than developed countries. Money 
is what money does. On the other hand, the magnitude of the 
money demanded for transaction purposes may be different 
between the two groups of countries. In less developed 
countries, due to the high degree of imperfections in the 
money markets, it seems that more money may be required for 
a given amount of transactions. The notion that any prom­
issory note other than cash is not "money" still prevails 
in many underdeveloped monetized areas. Thus, transactions 
are mainly carried out on a cash basis, rather than through 
any credit instruments. Hence, for a given amount of trans­
actions, more money may be demanded in less developed coun­
tries than developed countries. Contrarily, the existence 
of a relatively large nonmonetized sector in less developed 
economies may counteract this tendency. Many transactions 
in the nonmonetized sector of the economy do not involve 
money and, consequently, the transaction demand for money 
may not even exist in this case. For this reason, there 
are two directly opposite forces acting on the transaction 
demands for money in less developed countries and it is hard 
to say which one is stronger.
With respect to the precautionary demand for money, 
it is not an overstatement to say that its magnitude is 
negligible in developing countries. This is due to one or 
several of the following reasons.
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First, underdeveloped countries are, by definition,
3 5poor countries. Many people in underdeveloped countries 
are living in a bare subsistence condition. It is hard for 
these people to set aside any resources for the rainy days 
after they have fed, clothed and sheltered themselves. 
Hoarding, therefore, is virtually nonexistent. In many 
instances, it is not due to the unwillingness to save on 
the part of the people, but simply, it is due to the 
inability to put aside any monetary asset for precautionary 
purposes.
Secondly, in the nonmonetized sector of the less 
developed countries it is useless to save in monetary terms. 
Individual economic units, namely the household or family, 
have always been self-sufficient and it is very difficult 
for the people to see that saving for precautionary motives 
is good for them. Even if they save (hoard) up bank notes 
or coins occasionally, they may never be able to circulate 
the currency, since their day-to-day transactions are often 
in terms of barter exchange. Money may not be a widely 
accepted legal tender in this case also.
Thirdly, financial instability is another factor 
affecting the precautionary demand for money. Many less 
developed countries have experienced some kind of inflation 
in the past decade. In the eyes of many individuals in 
these countries, the legal tender issued by their local 
monetary authorities often does not guarantee a future
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command over the same resources that they can obtain today.
To put this in simpler terminology, a dollar today will not 
be worth a dollar tomorrow. The incentive to save may be 
further aggravated by instances of individual confiscation 
or general recall or revaluation of money. Past experiences 
of this kind of unhappy event can remain very deeply seated 
in the minds of many people and they tend to affect future 
expectations.
Finally, saving is an act of willingness to part 
with present consumption for future consumption. In some 
less developed countries, social or religious custom may 
not allow individuals to perform this act. For example, 
the idea of eat, drink and be merry now, rather than never, 
may hamper the precautionary demand for money to some extent.
As for the speculative demand for money, all of the
above four factors on precautionary demand apply. In addi­
tion, due to the underdevelopment of organized money mar-
3 6kets, opportunities for potential speculators are limited.
In sum, Keynes proposed a theory underlying the 
demand for liquidity that is more relevant to the developed 
countries. With some modification, we can see that given 
a rate of interest, the demand for liquidity will be much 
lower in a developing than in a developed country. Thus, 
the liquidity preference curve tends to lie further to the 
left (with the interest rate at the vertical axis) in the
case of a less developed country.
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The Neoclassicista
This school of thought in regard to the role of 
money in a growing economy has raised a number of questions 
including the following: (1) To what extent can monetary
policies and institutional arrangements affect the time pro­
files of an economy's capital-labor ratio, the real wage 
and the rent of capital? (2) Can variations in the rate of 
growth of money affect the time profiles, and steady state 
solutions of the real variables? and (3) Is there an opti­
mum growth of the various types of money?
In attempting to answer the above questions, the neo- 
classicists construct monetary growth models--models that 
were built on a well developed economy which is fully employed 
and have a rather sophisticated financial sector. For 
example, Stein wrote:
Monetary policy can affect the time profile of the 
capital intensity, as well as its sorady state solu­
tion . . . if it can shift either the consumption func­
tion or the net production function. . . . The neo­
classical monetary growth model considers how these 
shifts can occur within a fully employed economy 
[italics are the present author ' s3 . V
Since the neoclassical monetary growth theory is 
mainly concerned with developed economies, it may not be 
directly applicable to the less developed countries. Never­
theless, it is briefly discussed here in the interests of 
completeness of our review. It is very difficult to discuss 
all the approaches to the problem of money and economic 
growth taken by the neoclassicists. Only a few representative
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models will be briefly presented below. No attempt will be 
made to go into the mechanics of these models.
James Tobin may be regarded as one of the earliest 
writers to include money in economic growth models. In 
1955 he constructed a macro model combining both the aggre-
38gate production function and the monetary sector. Unfor­
tunately this model did not draw much attention until ten
years later with the appearance of his second article on
39money and growth. According to Wan,
. . . Tobin cast his theory in terms of balanced growth
models. The essence of his approach is that saving in 
a monetary economy may take the form of either physical 
capital or an expansion of the real balance of "outside 
money." For this reason, the balanced growth capital/ 
labor ratio (and therefore the output per worker, the 
wage and rent rates, etc.) depends upon the "portfolio 
balance," viz., the decision of the public to hold a 
particular portion of wealth in money assets and a par­
ticular portion in physical assets.’®
Thus, in terms of policy, monetary policy can affect
the balanced growth capital/labor ratio if the planned savings
ratio (or portfolio balance) is affected by the rate of
monetary expansion.
One of the outcomes of Tobin's model is that, ceteris
paribus, a monetary economy has a lower balanced growth
capital/labor ratio than a barter economy. Levhari and
Patinkin were able to show that this paradoxical result was
due to an omission of two major functions of money in Tobin's
model.
. . . In the first case, the services rendered by money
balances should appear in the individual's utility
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function and hence in his (imputed) disposable income; 
whereas in the second they should reflect themselves in 
the production function. Neither of these approaches, 
however, is reflected in the preceding (Tobin's) 
model. . . .4l
In recent years, another type of growth model has
k.2,evolved--the Keynes-Wicksell money growth model.
Because they contain independent savings and invest­
ment functions and explain inflation in the steady state 
in terms of Wicksell's cumulative process, they have 
come to be called Keynes-Wicksell models. . . . these
Keynes-Wicksell models imply that money is not neutral, 
although the direction of the effect of an increase in 
the rate of growth of the money supply on the steady- 
state values of the capital-labor ratio, the rate of 
return on capital, etc. cannot be determined theoreti­
cally . 43
Undoubtedly, the Keynes-Wicksell and Tobin monetary 
growth models are breakthroughs in growth economics.
Because these models are more relevant to the developed 
countries, we turn our attention now to one which is more 
useful as an explanation of the less developed countries.
kkShaw and McKinnon--The New View
Realizing the inadequacy of the neoclassical model
in treating money in less developed countries, McKinnon and
Shaw proposed alternative models to deal with the problem.
Their two books on finance and development came out at approxi-
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mately the same time in 1973» We shall put more emphasis 
on McKinnon's model because it is easier to use in terms of 
exposition. The approaches the two authors took in analyzing 
the fragmented, less developed economies are quite different, 
and yet the conclusion and policy prescription they arrived
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at are very similar. In the case of Shaw, financial deep- 
ening--the accumulation of financial assets at a pace 
faster than the accumulation of nonfinancial wealth--is 
the key for monetary liberalization. His Debt Intermedia­
tion View calls for policies to ". . . induce more rapid
growth in real money balances that the public desires to
46hold and to use as a means of payment. . . ."
The major argument of McKinnon's New View is that 
money and capital are complementary to each other, instead 
of substitutes— in less developed countries. This break­
through from the orthodox neoclassical theory provides at 
least one illuminating solution to the problem of under­
development .
In the New View, some of the neoclassical relation­
ships are retained. They are;
(1) the monetary authority controls the deposit rate 
and the rate of expansion of nominal cash bal­
ances, A, thereby determining the real return
of holding money;
(2) individuals do form expectations about future 
price movement which largely affect the amount 
of actual cash balance holdings ; and
(3) the price level is to be determined by the supply 
and demand of nominal money.
In addition, the New View introduces the following 
assumptions :
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(a) There is no, or very little, outside finance.
All economic units are self-financed.
That is, the firms do not borrow from or lend to the house­
holds and vice versa. This assumption, though generally 
valid in many underdeveloped rural areas, is introduced for 
simplicity.
(b) Indivisibilities of investment exist due to the 
size of the firm or household and they play a 
very important role in capital accumulation.
(c) The government does not participate directly in 
capital accumulation.
That is, deficit or surplus finance is excluded. Revenues 
are collected only for current government consumption.
Now suppose an individual wants to purchase physical 
capital that he cannot produce by himself. Being confined 
to self-finance by assumption (a) what he can do is to accu­
mulate his own physical output so that he can sell the inven­
tory to acquire the desired physical capital. Another possi­
bility is to accumulate cash balances. Which alternative 
he chooses depends on the real returns of holding money and 
the inventory. If his output is perishable agricultural 
products, then he may have to convert his inventory to a 
cash balance periodically before he saves enough to buy the 
desired capital.
Assumption (b) implies that a substantial amount of 
purchasing power is concentrated at the point of the
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investment. That is, at the moment when the individual buys 
the physical capital (we can look upon the physical capital 
as, say, a piece of equipment). Hence, the average time lag 
between income and expenditure will be longer for investment 
than for consumption, and the average cash holding will also 
be higher. More precisely, ". . . if the desired rate of
capital accumulation (and hence private saving) increases 
at any given level of income, the average ratio of real cash
.47balances to income will also increase, 
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Consider, two individual economic units A and B.
Let us assume that they receive the same income continuously 
through time. They will build up cash balances as they 
receive their steady stream of income and their disburse­
ments are shown by the vertical drops. These vertical 
drops indicate the indivisibilities of the disbursements 
and their sum should be equal for both units, because they
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receive the same income periodically. The propensity to 
save is indicated by the spacing and size of the vertical 
drops. For example, A will accumulate its income during 
time period RK, and then spend it. The amount spent is QK. 
Similarly, B will accumulate its income during OM and spend 
MN at point M. Clearly, A has a smaller propensity to save 
due to its short time lag between income and disbursement, 
or the smaller disbursement, QK. On the other hand, B,
an investment minded unit has a higher propensity to save,
or a larger average cash balance. Average cash balance is
given by OP for A and by OS for B. Hence, average cash
balance is positively related to the propensity to save 
under our New View.
Under the New View, the money demand equation is:
I  = H(Y, d-P*) (6)
where M/P = the real cash balance;
Y = the real income ;
i = the real rate of interest, i.e., the real
rate of return on physical capital and 
financial assets other than money; and 
r = the real return on money which is equal to 
the interest rate paid on bank deposits, d, 
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In particular, if we assume that there is an average 
return on capital, r, measuring the mean of the different 
returns on capital, with a given dispersion and replacing 
I/Y by f, we have;
^  = H(Y, f, d - P*)
and
3T ) O' 3? ) 6(d":-p«T ^
Given an exogeneous change in f (for example, a 
green revolution), individual economic units will increase 
their desire to invest because of the higher f. That is, 
the propensity to invest will increase. People will build 
up larger cash balances before they make their lump sum 
disbursement which will result in an increase in the demand 
for money.
The mechanics of this alternative model Eire quite 
different from that of the neoclassical model. Money, 
instead of being a substitute for physical capital, as in 
the neoclassical model, is a complementary asset under the 
New View. A rise in the average rate of return to physical 
capital increases the propensity to save (i.e., the I/Y 
ratio), which in turn increases the desired real cash 
balances. Conversely, a rise in the real return of holding 
money will induce people to use money as a store of value.
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to a greater extent. Self-financed investment will thus 
rise to follow. People who used to keep large and unproduc­
tive inventories will use money as a store of value. A 
small farmer who has the habit of keeping unduly large rice 
inventories (part of which may become rotten or eaten by 
rats), or a factory owner who used to purposely "over­
invest" in plant capacity will now start to use money as a 
store of value. Real resources, instead of being channelled 
to nonproductive, fixed or working capital is now freed for 
use in more efficient production. Thus, with a rise in the 
real return of money, there will also be a rise in the 
aggregate output when the low productivity capital is 
employed more efficiently.
What then is the implication to monetary policy 
behind this New View? With the supposition of a green revo­
lution, the real return on capital will increase, followed 
by a rise in the propensity to save or invests The demand 
for real money balances will also increase for a given level 
of income. Under the New View, the monetary authority would 
let the supply of money increase, thereby, avoiding defla­
tion. Under the orthodox view, however, government should 
contract the nominal supply of money so as to stop the 
inflationary pressure due to the rise in investment.
If there is no-green revolution, the only course of 
action left is to increase the real rate of return on 
money--i.e., higher real rates of interest--by an increase
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in nominal interest rates or price deflation. So we can 
see that when the imperfections of money markets in less 
developed countries are taken into consideration, the New 
View calls for increases in real rates of interest so as to 
induce higher rates of capital accumulation, which is quite 
contrary to the orthodox views.
By way of summary, most of the literature concerning 
finance and development is confined to two main issues.
The first issue is that of the role of finance in economic 
development. Depending on which position one takes, money 
can be an active, permissive or passive factor in economic 
development. Parallel to this is the causal relationship 
between finance and economic development. Financial 
development may be "demand following" or "supply leading," 
or a mixture of both. Different countries may follow dif­
ferent financial paths and according to Gurley, a univer­
sally optimal path may not even exist. Despite Cameron's 
extensive country-by-country studies, and Goldsmith's 
thought provoking empirical work, the issue of the role of 
finance in development is still quite ambiguous. Chandavarkar, 
on the contrary, argued that the causality of finance and 
economic development is not as important as adopting the 
appropriate policies to stimulate finance and economic 
development in the contemporary world. This leads us to 
the second issue which concerns the mechanics or process of
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economic development vis-a-vis financial liberalization. 
According to Shaw, financial deepening is a path to financial 
liberalization. He calls for policies to induce higher 
growth in real balances so as to accumulate financial assets 
at a rate faster than that of nonfinancial wealth. As with 
the desire to hold money, the Keynesian Liquidity Preference 
Theory is centered around developed economies which requires 
considerable amendment before it can be applied to less 
developed countries. Similarly, the neoclassicists, neglect­
ing the distinct characteristics of the financial markets 
in developing countries, treat money and physical capital 
as substitutes which often render their policy prescription 
inflationary. McKinnon incorporated the imperfection of 
the less developed financial markets and came up with the 
New View which regards money and physical capital as compli­
ments in the asset holder's portfolio. His theory is more 
relevant to the lagging less developed economies than that 
of the Keynesian or Neoclassical models.
CHAPTER III
MONEY AND BANKING IN ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT
Following our brief review of the literature on 
finance and economic development, we will now come to exam­
ine in a more detailed fashion the main characteristic fea­
tures of the financial sector of less developed countries. 
This will be followed by the proposal of a number of 
hypotheses concerning banking in economic development and 
the formulation of financial indicators.
Characteristics of Financial Markets 
in Less Developed Countries
Existence of Nonmonetized Sector 
In a developed country, the economy is usually 
fully monetized. Transactions are carried out in terms of 
a legal tender. This is not the case in the less developed 
countries where there is still a large proportion of transac­
tions done through the medium of barter exchange. Since 
most less developed countries have a relatively big agricul­
tural sector, many of their economic units--especially 
households--do not even have contact with the monetary 
exchange economy. Families who are mainly engaged in farming
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are always trying to be self-sufficient. This is more 
true in the old colonial countries where tne main economic 
activity is the export of a few primary products. It is in 
these industries that monetization prevails. For that part 
of the economy which is not related to the production of 
primary products, monetization seems to be remote. Even in 
the areas where the primary export crops are produced, 
monetization may not be fully achieved. Farmers may borrow 
their farming equipment and daily necessities from their 
landlords and repay in kind during the harvest seasons.
Hence, even in a monetary exchange economy, circulation of 
money is often confined to the elite--the landlords, exporters, 
etc.
Organized Money Market
A less developed economy is "lagging" or "frag­
mented." Fragmented in the sense that firms and households 
are so isolated, whether in terms of physical distance or 
communication, that they face different sets of effective 
prices for land, capital and labor. The case of capital is 
especially clear, due to the fact that two distinctly dif­
ferent markets--the organized and unorganized money markets-- 
coexist in the same economy. We shall deal with the orga­
nized market first.
Among the different types of financial institutions 
in the organized money market, the central bank is the 
nucleus. It is a national monument which everyone looks
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up to and upon which all financial activities in the orga­
nized money market depend. Traditionally, the main function 
of a central bank is to control the commercial banking 
system with the objective of stabilizing the economy. Cur­
rency issue plays only a subsidiary role. For developed 
countries, like the United States or Great Britain, the 
major weapons for controlling tlie credit base of the com­
mercial banks are open market operations and the manipula­
tion of the bank rate. A large number of central banks in 
the poor nations which have transplanted these controls 
often find these policies or structures inappropriate, if 
not completely useless. As Sayers remarked:
. . . The growing doubt that eventually checked the
multiplication of central banks was, however, not 
. . . the question of theory but rather reflection
upon the experience of some of the infants. In one 
country after another open-market operations were just 
a dream, because there was no market in which to oper­
ate. The member banks were powerful institutions: 
many of them were free to draw upon their own offices 
in the world's leading financial centers and never 
needed to go near the central bank, whose rediscount 
rate remained completely inoperative. . . .
After repeated failures of their policy tools in 
bringing about the anticipated result, central bankers in 
less developed countries are beginning to learn their les­
sons and have begun to take a new look at their policy tools 
The commercial bank is usually the leading private 
institution in the organized money market. Since many less 
developed countries today were colonies in the past, their 
economies were based on colonial economic systems in which
42
the commercial banking system was dominated by expatriate 
international banking organizations. These foreign banks 
were the sole money market creators in many instances. 
Because of the particular structure of the less developed 
economies and the financial strength of these foreign 
banks, they usually swallowed the lion's share of the money 
market. These foreign banks, with their head offices in 
developed countries, have had the experience and technologi­
cal know-how for handling trade in the world markets. As 
the main source of foreign exchange to the less developed 
countries is from the export of a few primary products, 
agricultural exporters inevitably have had to rely on the 
well established foreign banks to handle their international 
transactions (e.g., bills of exchange, letters of credit, 
etc.). The indigenous local banks, lacking the volume and 
facilities have had to step aside and operate on business 
that was left over from the foreign banks.
To cite an example of the concentration of foreign 
banks in less developed countries, Crick noted that:
The importance of the foreign.banks in the Malaysian 
system is reflected in their share of total banking 
business. Nearly sixty percent of total deposits in 
Singapore are placed in foreign banks, and in the for­
mer Federation possibly over sixty-five percent of 
total deposits are in nonrMalaysian banks. The British 
banks dominate not only the foreign banks, but the whole 
of Malaysian banking. They might well account for up 
to forty percent of the total banking business in Singa­
pore , and possibly for over half the total in the 
Federation. They have a virtual monopoly of banking 
in the Borneo territories, . . .’^
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It is true that the organized money markets in 
less developed countries are usually created mainly by 
international banks. However, there exist numerous defects 
when the foreign banks are dominating the market. First, 
a foreign bank situated in a less developed economy is 
merely regarded as a branch of the bank--its head office 
being located in the home country. In terms of operation, 
there is no reason to assume that a branch office should 
act independently and differently from the head office.
Thus, very often the foreign branch--where the local demand 
for loans is limited or qualified loan customers are few-- 
will accumulate excess funds, which will eventually be trans­
ferred to the more active branches of the bank outside the 
less developed country. A dilemma then evolves: while the
less developed country lacks domestic capital for invest­
ment or development, on the one hand, the foreign banks on 
the other hand, accumulate funds within the country and 
remit the funds overseas where there is higher profit and 
less risk.
Secondly, foreign banks are established in the less 
developed countries for the sole purpose of dealing in trade 
or commercial finance. The kind of finance which developing 
economies need most urgently at the present time, however, 
is for production and industry. The latter requires a 
relatively longer term than finance in trade. That is, it 
will take a longer period for a factory owner to repay his
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loan for buying capital equipment than an exporter to pay 
back his trade credit. Foreign banks which have access to 
other more secure and profitable markets (overseas) will 
not have too much incentive to take part in the finance of 
industry or investment, even though, for the same rate of 
return the probability of default is higher for loans in 
developing countries than in developed countries.
Thirdly, every effort has been made by less devel­
oped countries to expand their organized money markets. It 
is, however, too much to expect the foreign banks to partici­
pate in this. To establish branches or expand into the 
rural areas simply takes a long time to pay off, if they 
pay off at all, because of the low level of economic activity 
prevalent in the rural agricultural areas.
To sum up, many commercial banking systems in the 
less developed countries are dominated by foreign banks 
which may be an advantage or a disadvantage to the developing 
nation. It is undeniable that foreign banks should be 
credited for establishing and supporting the organized money 
markets, but they may also be a source of leakage to domes­
tic capital abroad, unless appropriate action is taken to 
prevent this. Furthermore, the interests of foreign banks 
quite often conflict with that of the less developed coun­
tries. In studying colonial banking, Nevin summarized the 
above neatly:
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The broad result of all these features of colonial 
bauking--the integration of all branches of the bank 
into a single unit administered from the head office, 
the concentration of credit on expatriate primary- 
producing or trading enterprises, the application of 
conventions and standards exported from the home 
country--was at least until quite recent years an 
inadequate rate of expansion of credit for new devel­
opment in most dependent territories. The banking 
system had the effect of channelling funds away from 
local industrial development and towards the country 
in which the banks' head offices are located. . . .
Many of Nevin's comments remain true in the less developed
countries nowadays, though the dominance of foreign banks
is gradually weakening.
Apart from the dominating foreign banks, there are 
the locally incorporated commercial banks. Many of these 
local banks have a long history and are nearly as old as 
the country itself. They are usually family owned and 
management just passes on from generation to generation.
Thus, the local banks are seldom innovative entrepreneurs 
if we regard bankers as entrepreneurs.^^ They are conserva­
tive and avoid risk. It follows that when the local banks 
have to operate on whatever business is left over from the 
foreign banks, they are apt to practice on a conservative 
basis. For example, they tend to hold excessive unborrowed 
reserves, and have rigid insistence on approved securities 
as collateral for borrowed money (e.g., real estate or govern­
ment securities) which may often have value which is several 
times higher than the amount of the loan.
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Unorganized Money Market 
Participants in an unorganized money market include 
money lenders, shopkeepers, pawn brokers, farmers, or any 
concerns who supply or demand funds and are unable or un­
willing to go to the organized money market. Fragmentation 
is a main feature in the unorganized money market. These 
markets are scattered around in the rural areas with hetero­
geneity. Participants usually do not know what is going on 
in other markets. Borrowers, as well as money lenders, 
have no idea of what other borrowers are paying or lenders 
are charging. In fact, some of the transactions are exchange 
in kind rather than through a medium of exchange. Imperfec­
tions in the market mean that the borrowers usually have to 
take whatever they offered. Examples of interest rates as 
high as 100 or 200 percent a year have been found in Ethiopia 
for providing loans, and as little as $50 to $100 has been 
cited. This kind of imperfection or lack of market infor­
mation is due to several reasons. First, unorganized money 
markets are more active in the rural areas where the major 
part of the population is engaged in farming. Borrowers in 
the unorganized markets are usually small farmers, cottage 
industry workers or some retail shopkeepers. Most of them 
do not have access to the organized money markets, nor do 
they have any contact with it. Hence, it is often very 
difficult, if not impossible, for the borrower to shop 
around before he makes his commitment. Secondly, the
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purpose oi the loan very often carries a sense of urgency 
or "necessity." Poor farmers need capital in the slack 
seasons or in between the time they harvest the crop and 
actually put it on the market for sale. A cottage industry 
worker, due to social custom, may have to borrow money to 
pay his wedding feast. All these situations make the bor­
rower an interest taker, leaving little room for him to 
bargain. Finally, on the part of the lender, he is usually 
well informed about his customer and, therefore, he will 
always try to set his interest rate at the level which will 
allow him to get the most out of the borrower. In an iso­
lated rural area, a money lender may be a farmer, a store­
keeper, or even the borrower's relative. He often has 
intimate personal knowledge about his customer— e.g., the 
number of dependents the borrower has, the probability of 
default, etc.--so that he can optimize his loanable fund by 
minimizing his risk and maximizing profit.
The supply of loanable funds in the unorganized 
money markets is inelastic and very limited, due to the 
nature of the suppliers. The major sources of loanable 
funds are landlords or merchants who do not derive their 
income solely from lending money. They are willing to lend 
only at rates which are higher than the return from their 
normal course of business activity--which is usually quite 
high already. Unlike the commercial banks, the capital or 
loanable funds are merely savings of the individuals, the
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supply of which is highly inelastic. The lack of informa­
tion on the part of the borrowers adds more monopolistic 
power to the lender. Furthermore, since many countries 
regard usury as illegal, money lenders have to have a 
higher return to offset the risk of being caught. All 
these result in a high rate of interest being charged in 
the unorganized money market.
Capital Market
Capital markets are usually at their infantile stage 
in many less developed countries. Long term capital does 
exist in many of these lagging economies, but unfortunately, 
the capital is not channelled into its proper use. It is 
not uncommon to find huge long term capital invested in 
real estate such as luxurious apartments or recreation areas , 
which only the rich can afford to enjoy. Another source of 
long term capital is from the local foreign enterprises.
Most of this capital comes from the head office or is retained 
earnings which will usually find its way back to the foreign 
enterprises without benefitting the local economy. Inevi­
tably, insufficient funds constitute the major factor of 
underdevelopment of the capital markets in underdeveloped 
countries.
Summing up the characteristics of the money and 
capital markets in less developed countries, the existence 
of a nonmonetized sector--coupled with unorganized money
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markets and underdevelopment in the capital markets--breed 
out the duality structure of interest rates. While the 
monetary authority is trying (according to orthodox theory 
and policy) to lower interest rates in the organized mar­
kets , there are continuing high rates prevailing in the 
unorganized markets. While the central bank is trying to 
stabilize the economy, the existence of a relatively large 
nonmonetized sector renders the traditional monetary policy 
tools— mainly open market operations and bank rates— close 
to being useless. Having looked at some of the major char­
acteristics of the financial markets in less developed coun­
tries, we can see why the orthodox monetary theories need 
to be amended to fit the structure of the less developed 
economies.
Banking in Economic Development 
After reviewing some of the characteristics of the 
financial markets in the less developed countries, we will 
now turn our attention to the measurement of financial 
development. Specifically, we will be concerned with the 
matter of the three proposed indicators of financial develop­
ment. As mentioned above the first two ratios, the deposit 
and claim ratios, have been used in the literature before 
while the efficiency ratio is a new formulation. Several 
hypotheses about the banking sector vis-a-vis these ratios 
will be presented later in this chapter.
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One of the major factors affecting the economic per­
formance of a developing country is the ability to increase 
the proportion of domestic resources which are available 
for investment, that is, the extent to which the rate of 
domestic savings is increased. However, an increase in the 
rate of domestic savings is not synonymous with an increase 
in the rate of investment if the available savings are not 
channeled into productive investments efficiently. In per­
forming the functions of attracting savings and channelling 
them into productive investments, the financial institutions 
play an important role. They tap the savings from the 
private sector and redistribute them to the business firms 
for investment. To the extent that financial institutions 
in developing countries are dominated by commercial banks, 
these intermediating functions are largely carried out by 
these banks. The more efficient the banking system is, the 
more domestic savings that can be accumulated and trans­
formed into investments; thus, utilizing financial resources 
to the maximum for development purposes.
The Meaning of the Financial Indicators
The Deposit Ratio
The deposit ratio is defined as total bank deposit 
divided by the money supply. The ratio shows the extent 
to which the public is utilizing the services offered by 
the banking institutions. For example, it shows the degree
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to which people are using the banks for settlement of debts, 
or the use of checking accounts instead of currency as a 
medium of exchange. On the other hand, the ratio also gives 
an indication of the ability of the banking sector in mar­
keting their services to the public. For example, when bank 
offices spread to the less developed rural areas, farmers 
can have the opportunity to keep their savings as bank 
deposits instead of in a form of say excessive wheat inven­
tory.
In terms of monetary policy, a high deposit ratio 
(i.e. a high deposit component of the money supply) implies 
that the monetary base of the banking system is high, thereby 
providing a larger scope for monetary policy to operate 
than in the case of a low monetary base. Note that though 
an increase in the magnitude of the deposit ratio will 
increase the credit base of the banks which the monetary 
authority is in the position to regulate, the immediate 
short-run effect of monetary policy on the banking sector 
cannot be captured in a specific ratio. For example, just 
by looking at the I96O deposit ratio of Peru will not tell 
us much about the effect of the expansionary policy that the 
country was following. We have to look at the ratio from, 
say, i960 to 1965. If the expansionary policy was success­
ful , then the deposit ratio in these five years should be 
increasing after eliminating the time effect.
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A high deposit ratio implies that people are 
making more use of the banking institutions while the 
monetary authority is in a better position to implement 
its monetary policy more efficiently. As the financial 
sector develops, wa would expect the ratio to increase.
That is, within a given country, if we look at the time 
series of deposit ratio, we may find that it has an 
increasing trend.
The Claim Ratio
The claim ratio is defined as the ratio of the 
banking sector's claim on the private sector to GNP.
Looking at the other side of the balance sheet, we have 
the banking system's claim on the private sector. This 
includes among other items, loans or advances to the public , 
bills discounted, etc. The claim ratio shows the extent 
to which the private business and industrial units are 
making use of the commercial banking system to finance their 
operations. As the financial sector develops, business and 
industries will tend to use more and more external finance. 
As the commercial banks may be the most readily available 
source of external finance in many less developed coun­
tries , the commercial banks' claim on the private sector 
will therefore tend to rise more rapidly than GNP. Like 




The question of how to evaluate a banking system 
has remained unsolved for a long time. Many economists 
just regard the banking system as given and do away with 
the whole problem. Others try to attack the problem by 
presenting theoretical and judgmental criteria of what a 
good system should be. For example, Beckhart suggests 
that :
The basic test of a well-functioning financial 
system, whether in the United States or in any other 
nation, is its ability to finance credit needs, which 
contribute to economic growth, and to finance those 
needs in such fashion that inflation and economic 
instability are not engendered. . . .53
Greenbaum, on the other hand, sets up a list of
desirable performance characteristics of a banking system
54that has gained some popularity. Unfortunately most of
the characteristics are very difficult to quantify aind test 
55empirically.
Gramley was able to come up with a more operational 
definition of efficiency than Beckhart or Greenbaum. By 
relating efficiency to social welfare, Gramley writes;
"The amount of resources needed to provide a given quantity 
of banking services, evaluated in terms of its social value, 
would then provide a measure of the social efficiency with 
which resources were employed at the banking system.
The introduction of social value to the definition of 
efficiency may require some kind of subjective judgement
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which may lead to some difficulty when applied to less 
developed countries. In fact, many discussions on the 
effectiveness of a banking system are merely confined to 
the theoretical and abstract issues such as those mentioned 
above. The following pages present a more operational 
measure of efficiency.
The efficiency ratio Is defined as the percentage 
change in claim relative to the percentage change In depos­
its. The deposit ratio tells us to what extent can the 
commercial banks accumulate domestic savings, while the 
claim ratio reveals the extent to which the banks utilize 
their accumulated deposits. Each ratio gives us Informa­
tion on one side of the balance sheet only. The deposit 
ratio gives us Information on the liability side while the 
claim ratio tells us something about the asset side. The 
efficiency ratio combines the two to give us Information on 
both sides of the balance sheet.
If we consider the definition of the efficiency 
ratio, we can see that it includes an elasticity concept. 
That Is, the ratio can be viewed as an elasticity of Inter- 
medlation--the responsiveness of loans advanced by the com­
mercial banks with respect to changes in deposits. Further­
more, let us separate the efficiency ratio Into two 
components, that Is:
. % change In claim dCL DD
Efficiency ratio = ^ change in deposit = dDD CL
where CL = claim and DD = deposits
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The first factor dCL/dDD is the change in claim per unit 
change in deposit within a given time interval of say three 
years. Now for every additional unit of deposit a commer­
cial bank receives, there are several ways that it can be 
utilized. If the country concerned has a fractional reserve 
system, then part of the increase in deposit has to be kept 
as reserves to satisfy the reserve requirement. The rest 
can be used in different ways--loaning it out to business 
or individuals, buying government securities or simply 
keeping it as excess reserves. The resulting portfolio 
depends on three major factors: the different rates of 
return and risks associated with the different financial 
assets, the loan rate and the managerial ability of the 
portfolio manager (e.g. the ability to obtain market infor­
mation and the efficiency in selecting the optimal port­
folio, etc.). For the banking system as a whole, these 
same factors also apply. Thus the change in claim on the 
private sector per unit change in deposit is a function of 
monetary policy (reserve requirement, discount rate, etc.), 
the spectrum of rates of return on different financial 
assets and efficiency in portfolio selection.
The effect of monetary policy on the efficiency 
ratio needs to be discussed in more detail. Since a por­
tion of additional deposits a bank receives during a given 
period of time have to be kept as required reserves, the 
magnitude of dCL/dDD will change with a change in the
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reserve ratio. In the case of a tight money situation, 
and assujuing that monetary policy can be carried out effec­
tively, an increase in the required reserve ratio or the 
discount rate will tend to reduce the amount of loans to 
the private sector, i.e. a lower dCL/dDD. On the contrary, 
any expansionary policy will tend to allow the banking sector 
to advance more loans per additional unit of deposits 
received, thereby increasing dCL/dDD. It follows that the 
short-run effect of monetary policy will be revealed through 
the efficiency ratio. This is consistent with using the 
ratio as a measure of the efficiency of intermediation when 
we consider the fact that monetary policy can have an impor­
tant influence on the intermediation efficiency of financial 
institutions.
The second factor in the efficiency ratio, DD/CL 
gives an average of the deposit that can be derived from 
one unit of claim. It indicates how well the banking sector 
did in attracting deposits in the past. Any change in 
monetary policy during the period when the efficiency ratio 
is computed will not affect this factor as it gives the ini­
tial average deposit per unit of claim.
When the two factors are combined to form the effi­
ciency ratio, we can see that it is superior to the deposit
or claim ratio. It takes into consideration of the effec­
tiveness of obtaining both the input and output of the
57
commercial banks plus indicating the effect of monetary 
policy on the banking sector.
Let us consider two particular cases when the effi­
ciency ratio seems to have a distinct superiority over the 
deposit and claim ratios in indicating the level of financial 
development. In the cases of chronic inflation or defla­
tion, the deposit or claim ratio may be a misleading indi­
cator. We shall only consider the case of inflation as the 
situation under deflation is just the reverse. Furthermore, 
our analysis is only concerned with mild or intermediate 
inflation. The situation under a hyper-inflation is not 
considered here. In a period of chronic inflation, prices 
are increasing continuously and so is money. The amount of 
demand deposits required to carry out a particular transac­
tion will increase. The deposit ratio will not change if 
and only if both currency and demand deposits are increasing 
at the same rate. If demand deposits are rising faster than 
currency, then the deposit ratio will increase. We shall see 
whether this is the case in the less developed countries.
Let us reflect on who are the checking account 
holders in a less developed country. Probably they will be 
individuals with high incomes or large business firms. The 
latter seem to be more significant because large business 
firms probably need a checking account to carry out their 
transactions. Assume that a given business firm used to 
carry $10 thousand in cash and to keep $100 thousand in the
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checking account for a given unit of time before inflation. 
Assume further that prices have now doubled, which means that 
under normal circumstances the firm will have to keep 
$20 thousand in cash and $200 thousand in demand deposits.
If every firm in the economy behaves like this, the deposit 
ratio will remain the same as before because the money supply 
has doubled and demand deposits have also doubled. It is 
doubtful whether the firm will increase its cash holdings 
proportionately to that of demand deposits. One reason is 
that instead of counting the amount of currency which is 
twice than before, it may be more convenient and less time 
consuming to write a check to settle a transaction. That is, 
instead of counting ten $100 bills as in the past, one has 
to count twenty $100 bills which may not be as convenient 
and efficient as writing a check. This means that transac­
tions which used to be carried out on a cash basis will 
now be done through the bank. Notice that it is the same 
group of people (the business firms) who is utilizing more 
of the banking facilities.
Another reason which induces people to keep a pro­
portionately larger amount of demand deposits is because 
interest may be earned on demand deposits. This is not 
unusual in many less developed countries. This apparently 
raises the attractiveness of holding demand deposits relative 
to cash. In sum, convenience and a pecuniary return on
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demand deposits may induce people to increase their holding 
of demand deposits at a faster rate than currency.
Let us consider the broad definition of the deposit 
ratio, i.e. deposits include time and savings deposits in 
addition to demand deposits. It may not be an overstate­
ment to say that most of the holders of savings and time 
deposits belong to the upper income group in the less 
developed countries. Inflation may result in a redistribu­
tion of income. If the rich are going to get richer, 
then people in the upper income group may tend to put more 
money into their savings accounts. Furthermore, to the 
extent that income levels may be related to education levels 
which in turn may condition money holding practices, an 
increase in income may induce a person to keep a relatively 
larger amount of money in the form of savings or time 
deposits than simply holding the increased income in cash. 
Hence we may argue that the deposit ratio tends to rise 
during periods of inflation.
In sum, both the deposit and claim ratios will be 
high because of the inflationary effect rather than, say, 
an improvement in banking services offered or greater utili­
zation of the existing banking facilities by more people.
Now government authority cannot allow any sustained increase 
in prices unchecked. Probably government intervention will 
take place. The effect of any restrictive monetary policy
6o
will be transmitted through the dCL/dDD factor of the effi­
ciency ratio. The dCL/dDD will decline as banks are more 
reluctant to extend additional credit to the private sector. 
The magnitude of the DD/CL factor is difficult to assess 
because in a chronic inflation both deposit and claim ratios 
tend to be high. When DD/CL is weighted by the low dCL/dDD 
the resultant efficiency ratio will tend to have a lower 
value. Therefore, though the deposit and claim ratios have 
high values in a period of chronic inflation, indicating 
that the financial sector is highly developed--which in 
fact is not--the efficiency ratio gives a truer view of the 
intermediation efficiency of the banking system.
Based upon the above discussion on the three finan­
cial ratios, we may hypothesize that;
(1) The deposit ratio in developing countries tends to 
increase over time (i.e., it has an increasing trend). 
Furthermore, the level of the ratio is positively related 
to a country's level of economic development.
(2) The claim ratio has an increasing trend and the level 
of the ratio is positively related to economic develop­
ment .
(3) The efficiency ratio is directly related to the rate of 
economic development during a given period, and it is a 
better indicator of financial development than the 
deposit and claim ratios.
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In the next chapter, the above hypotheses will be 
tested empirically and several case studies will be pre­
sented to support the hypothesis that the efficiency ratio 
is a better indicator of financial development.
CHAPTER IV
TESTING THE HYPOTHESES
One of the main purposes of this study is to 
investigate the relationship between financial and economic 
development. In Chapter III we defined the three ratios 
as indicators of financial development. Granted that these 
ratios are close proxies for indicating the size or effi­
ciency of a country's financial sector, we will now try to 
answer the following questions:
(1) Is there any positive association between finan­
cial and economic development?
If the answer is affirmative, then we can use the financial 
ratios as indicators of development--an aspect which has 
often been overshadowed by the real aspect of development 
in the literature.
(2) Which of the three financial ratios is statisti­
cally the best indicator of financial develop­
ment?
(3) What are the characteristics of these financial 
indicators? Do they tend to increase over time? 




We have hypothesized that the deposit and claim ratios are 
positively related to a country's level of development and 
that they have an increasing trend. In addition, the effi­
ciency ratio is also positively related to economic develop­
ment and is a better indicator of financial development 
than the others. We shall test the validity of these hypoth­
eses in this section. The methodology employed will be pre­
sented first, followed by the empirical results.
Methodology
How can we measure a country's level of economic 
development? This is a question which is often discussed 
by development economists. By definition, economic develop­
ment is a sustained increase in the standard of living. So 
a country's level of development can be measured by the 
standard of living enjoyed by its people. Real variables 
like output, number of refrigerators per family, consump­
tion of newsprint, calorie in-take per capita, etc., can be 
used to reflect a country's standard of living. It is 
generally agreed that Gross National Product per capita is 
among the best indicators of economic development and this 
is what we shall be using in this study. However, we have 
to be careful of the theoretical and empirical drawbacks 
associated with this indicator. Basically, the assumption 
of the existence of a best indicator is itself questionable. 
"Best" is used here in an empirical sense. That is, unless 
another indicator can be found which, in practice, performs
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better in describing and estimating the overall character­
istic of development, GNP per capita remains the variable 
that best points out the degree of economic development.
Notice that we are not using GNP per capita as an opera-
57tional definition of development in this case.
The empirical drawbacks of using GNP per capita as 
an indicator of economic development are well-known and 
they will only be discussed briefly here. First, the 
self-sufficient nature of the small village farms leaves a 
lot of output unrecorded officially in national income sta­
tistics, since these goods are produced and consumed by the 
same unit without going through any market. Second, not 
unrelated to the above point, the existence of nonmonetized 
sectors in the economy does not allow output to be valued 
accordingly. Income earned from production is usually in 
kind, rather than in monetary terms. Third, population data 
in less developed countries are inaccurate due to various 
problems associated with census taking. Last, even if 
accurate GNP and population data are available, the use of 
an appropriate exchange rate in converting the local cur­
rency to a common currency (or numeraire) for intercountry 
comparisons is subject to varying degrees of accuracy. The 
frequent realignment in exchange rates, especially during 
the last few years--in developed and less developed countries 
alike--makes it very difficult to value goods and services 
of individual countries accurately for comparison purposes.
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Despite all these questions as to its validity, GNP per 
capita is used in this study as an indicator of develop­
ment, not because it is the perfect choice but because it 
may be regarded as the "second best." However, the short­
comings of using GNP per capita as an indicator of develop­
ment should always be remembered.
The use of the financial ratios also has its draw­
backs. First, these ratios do not measure exactly the 
degree to which the banking sector participates in eco­
nomic development. Other relevant measures include the 
number of banking offices per capita and the multiplier of 
the banking industry, etc. Unfortunately none of this datum 
is readily available in the case of developing countries. 
Second, to the extent that the deposit ratio (total deposit 
to money supply) is of magnitude between zero and one, at 
successively higher stages of banking development, the ratio 
will increase but at a decreasing rate. This is so because 
the bank deposit is a component of the money supply. Graphi­
cally this can be illustrated as shown on the following page 
Assume that the currency component of the money 
supply is constant through time and that its value is C.
If we increase the total deposit (D) continuously, a curve 
can be traced out as has been done below. Notice that at 
higher values of D, the curve flattens out. That is, the
g. o
deposit ratio, R, increases at a decreasing rate. Thus, 







successively higher levels of the latter--and, assuming 
that banking development is positively associated with eco­
nomic development— the linear positive association between 
the two will not be as marked as at the lower levels. The 
zero to one limit of the deposit ratio simply constrains 
the relationship between banking and economic development.
Third, the growth of nonbank financial institutions 
may reduce the relative importance of the banking sector to 
some extent. The volume of commercial bank deposits may 
increase absolutely, but at a slower rate than when nonbank 
financial institutions come into existence. Nevertheless, 
the financial ratios remain good proxies of financial develop­
ment and their theoretical validity as indicators of finan­
cial development may be challenged only at relatively high 
levels of development, which rarely apply to the less devel­
oped countries selected.
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Having decided upon using GNP per capita as an 
indicator of economic development and having revealed the 
shortcomings of using it and the financial ratios, we will 
now select a method for validating the financial indicators. 
According to McGranahan, there are two ways of validation 
and selection of indicators; namely, the use of expert con­
sensus and the use of correlation analysis or related multi-
59variate techniques. The first method is similar to those 
used by Adelman and Morris--that of collecting expert opinion 
on a particular area from which some kind of subjective 
judgmental index can be formulated. This method is not 
feasible in the present study as expert opinion is not 
readily available. The second method is the one we are 
using and it calls for some explanation. If we agree upon 
GNP per capita as one of the best and valid indicators of 
economic development, then any indicator which has a close 
association with it (no matter whether the association is 
positive or negative) is empirically valid as an indicator 
of development.^^ So, if our financial ratios bear close 
association with GNP per capita, it follows that they too 
must be empirically valid as indicators of economic develop­
ment .
The selection of less developed countries to be
i
included in our study is a problem. As is well-known among 
economists, the accuracy and reliability of economic data 
on many less developed countries are not too high. Every
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effort is made in this study to be as accurate and consistent 
as possible in collecting the data. The communist countries 
are excluded from our sample because of the ambiguous role 
of their commercial banks. In fact, it is doubtful whether 
there exist any commercial banks that are free enterprises 
and which are not under direct state or government control 
in the communist bloc countries. As many noncommunist 
developing countries were included in our sample as pos­
sible, depending on the availability of data. A country is 
regarded as less developed if its per capita GNP in 1951 
was less than #400 in U.S. currency. This is merely an arbi­
trary criterion or a point of reference for selecting our 
sample, and there may be some countries which are semi­
developed today and yet were regarded as less developed in 
1951. A total of sixty less developed countries were 
selected from statistics published by the International 
Monetary Fund. A list of these countries appears in 
Appendix I. The 1972 issue of the International Financial 
Statistics Supplement is used as the major data source for 
this study, instead of the regular monthly bulletin or other 
publications, because it is the most consistent and reliable 
source available. This International Monetary Fund publica­
tion gives yearly figures on GNP, population, price, bank 
deposits, currency conversion ratio, etc., from 1948 to 
1971" If the monthly International Financial Statistics is 
used, adjustment has to be made to allow for revised data.
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which is loss accurate and more time consuming. The fol­
lowing annual series was collected for 1951-1971:
(1) Gross National Product
(2) Consumer Price Index
(3) Population
(4) Commercial Banks Demand Deposit
(5) Commercial Banks Savings and Time Deposit
(6) Commercial Banks Claims on Private Sector
(7) Money
(8) Quasi Money
(9) Currency Conversion Factor.
Some of these series need elaboration because of 
the ambiguity associated with them. According to the defini­
tion given in the International Financial Statistics,
"Money" as used here comprises Currency and 
Deposit money held by the domestic non-government sec­
tor. "Currency" consists of notes and coins in current 
use, "Deposit Money" means deposits unrestrictedly 
exchangeable on demand into currency at par and without 
penalty; but this statement requires qualification (see 
Quasi Money). Deposit Money is mainly a liability of 
the Deposit Money Banks but in some countries the Cen­
tral Bank also has small Deposit Money Liabilities to 
the Private Sector. . . .
"Quasi-Money" comprises Time and Savings Deposits 
held by domestic Private Sector with those institutions 
whose accounts are consolidated in the Monetary Survey. 
Withdrawals of Time and Savings Deposits are usually 
subject to notice or, if on demand, involve loss of 
interest or restriction of amount. . . . Quasi Money 
also includes Foreign Currency Deposits of residents.
For example, many banks in Latin America hold U.S. dollar 
deposits for customers. . . .
Apart from deposits with institutions outside the 
Surveys other forms of Quasi-Money are excluded which 
are important in the financial systems of the more 
developed countries, e.g. the direct holding of
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Treasury bills or other short-term paper by non- 
financial institutions or financial institutions which 
do not form part of the Monetary Survey. These hold­
ings are very often in direct competition with Time 
Deposits at the banks. . . .
Though the International Financial Statistics does 
not give an explicit definition of claims on the private 
sector, it is intuitively clear from the content in the 
Country Tables that commercial banks' advances to business 
and individuals constitute the main element in this item.
Any financial institution other than the money and banking 
system, for example, is part of the private sector.
The conversion factor presented in the Supplement 
of the International Financial Statistics is the most con­
sistent and reliable source for currency conversion.
It is used to convert statistics denominated in 
national currency into U.S. dollar equivalents and 
vice versa. . . . the annuals given . . . are simple
averages of monthly factors. . . . These conversions
are made in the monthly data in order to correctly 
represent the timing of changes in the factors and 
only the difference, if any, between the sum of months 
or quarters plus the a^uals is converted at the 
annual average factor.
This explanation, though expressed in an ambiguous and 
clumsy manner, at least suggests that the conversion factor 
is an appropriate series for converting different curren­
cies into a common unit.
After the sample of countries was drawn, the various 
financial ratios, GNP per capita and growth rates were com­
puted. It will be remembered that the deposit ratio for a 
given year is the share of the total deposits in commercial
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banks to money supply. Notice that there are two versions 
of deposit ratio that can be derived from the raw data. If 
we use the narrow definition of money, then the deposit 
ratio is simply the ratio of demand deposit to total money 
supply, , which is demand deposit plus currency. We shall 
call this ratio DDR. On the other hand, if we use the broad 
definition of money, the deposit ratio is the share of 
demand plus savings and time deposits to all of the above 
and to currency. We denote this ratio as DTR. It is an 
empirical matter as to whether DDR or DTR is more relevant 
to our study and so both ratios were tested. The claim 
ratio, CLR, for a given year is the share of total claims on 
the private sector to GNP. The efficiency ratio or the 
elasticity of intermediation is the ratio of percentage 
change in claims to the percentage change in total deposits. 
We label it as ER. In order to facilitate computation, 
which will be clear later on, the efficiency ratio was com­
puted for three-year periods. That is, for example, the ER 
for 1951 to 1953 is the percentage change in claims on the 
private sector between 1951-53 to the percentage change in 
deposits for the same period. The year 1951 is used as the 
beginning year in this study because the quality and quantity 
of statistics on less developed countries seems to have 
improved since the 1950's. We used 1971 as the cut off 
year in order to maintain a consistent series. Many coun­
tries tend to revise their data one or two years after they
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have first published the data. If the unrevised data are 
included with the revised ones, time series analysis may 
be distorted. Thus, though data as recent as 1973 are 
available, they have to be sacrificed for the sake of con­
sistency.
To analyze the relationship between financial and 
economic development, a gross examination of the data was 
first performed. Two groups of countries--developed and 
less developed--were compared with respect to their deposit 
and claim ratios, as well as the efficiency ratio. Fourteen 
developed countries were selected and their DDR, DTR and CLR 
were computed for the years 1951> 1957, 19^3 and 1971.
The list of developed countries selected is given in 
Appendix II. The efficiency ratio was also computed for 
periods 1951-53, 1957-59, 1963-65 eind I969-7I. An average 
of the fourteen countries' DDR, DTR and CLR was taken, 
respectively, in order to arrive at the respective overall 
ratio for the developed countries as a group. The same is 
done for the less developed countries. For example, the 
value 0.661 in Table 1 is the average of the fourteen 
developed countries' DTR in 1957 and it also represents the 
overall DTR for developed countries during 1957* If eco­
nomic development is positively related to financial devel­
opment , then we would expect the magnitude of these ratios 
to be higher in the case of developed countries as a group.
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To examine the relationship between financial and 
economic development more rigorously, cross section analyses 
of the three-year averages of DDR, DTR and CLR were per­
formed. Four three-year averages of the deposit and claim 
ratios, plus GNP per capita for 1951-53, 1957-59, 1963-65 and 
1969-71 were taken. Each averaged ratio was used to corre­
late with the averaged GNP per capita. Take the I963-65 
period as an example. Statistics on 55 less developed coun­
tries are available for this particular period. The sample 
size is thus 55 « The DDR, DTR, CLR and GNP per capita of 
each of these 55 countries is computed for every year. An 
average of the three years' DDR within each country is taken. 
The same is done for DTR and CLR. Three-year averages are 
taken in order to smooth out any irregularities which may 
have occurred in a particular year. It is hoped that any 
short-run distortions can be smoothed out within this period. 
Four successful periods with even lags in between were used 
in order to get some idea of how the ratios behave through 
time. That is, to see whether the association between each 
of the ratios and GNP per capita is stable or not and to 
see how the ratios move in the long run. If there is a 
positive association between financial and economic develop­
ment, the simple correlation coefficients between GNP per 
capita and the three-year averaged DDR, DTR and CLR, respec­
tively, will be positive. If the financial ratios have an
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increasing trend, then these ratios will have successively 
higher magnitudes in the four periods under study.
To determine how each financial ratio behaves through 
time in a particular country, six countries having annual 
data for at least twenty years (i.e., twenty observations) 
were arbitrarily chosen. The DDR, DTR and CLR of these 
countries were used to correlate with time. A numerical 
value was assigned to each observation as the time variable. 
For example, the number 1 was assigned to the 1951 (first) 
observation, 2 to the 1952 (second) observation, and so on.
If our hypothesis that the ratios have an increasing trend 
is valid, then there should be a significantly positive 
correlation between each of these ratios and the time 
variable.
To test the hypothesis that the efficiency ratio is 
positively related to the rate of economic development, as 
well as the level of development, two sets of correlation 
analyses were performed. First, the ER is used to corre­
late with the rate of change of real GNP per capita, and 
this is done for the periods 1951-53i 1957-59, 1963-65 and 
1969-71, respectively. Second, the ER is used to correlate 
with the three-year averages of GNP per capita for the same 
periods. Again, positive association between the ER and the 
rate of change, or level of GNP per capita, is expected.
If the ER is a better indicator statistically, then its
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correlation coefficient (with GNP per capita) should be 
higher than that of the DDR, DTR and CLR.
Results of Testing 
Let us examine the gross comparison between devel­
oped and less developed countries as two separate groups 
first. Table 1 below gives the financial ratios of the 
fourteen developed and sixty less developed countries. It 
is clear that developed countries do have higher financial 
ratios than less developed countries, consistently. For 
instance, the DDR in less developed countries is in the neigh­
borhood of 0.4 , while that for developed countries is around 
0.5. The DTR and CLR for less developed countries are about 
0 .5'and 0 .1 , respectively, while the same for developed 
countries are 0.6 and 0 .3. Each of the deposit or claim 
ratio for less developed countries is at least one point 
below that of the developed countries. The case of ER is 
even more marked, with the exception of the 1969-71 period. 
This relatively small differential in the ER between the 
two groups of countries in 1969-71 may indicate that the 
banking sector in less developed countries is catching up 
and is performing as efficiently as that in the developed 
countries. However, one must not take this interpretation 
without any qualification, for if we compare the ER between 
1963-65 and 1969-71, for developed countries, we can see 




FINANCIAL RATIOS OF DEVELOPED AND LESS DEVELOPED 
COUNTRIES IN SELECTED YEARS
1951 1957 1963 1971
Developed Countries
DDR 0.509 0.500 0.555 0.603
DTR 0.629 0.661 0.724 0.800
CLR 0. 286 0.302 0.381 0.453
ER 1.469 0.920 1.191 1.161
Less Developed Countries
DDR 0.461 0.471 0.452 0.526
DTR 0.521 0.551 0.561 0.690
CLR 0.092 0.099 0.131 0.211
ER 1.098 0.864 1.019 1.157
Source: Computed from International Monetary Fund, Inter­
national Financial Statistics, Supplement, 1972.
If we move one step further we can gain a rough idea 
of how the financial ratios behave over time. The deposit 
and claim ratios in both groups of countries do have a roughly 
increasing trend. For example, the DTR for developed coun­
tries increased raonotonically from 0.629 in 1951 to 0.800 
in 1971. The same is true for the less developed countries 
in which the DTR increased from 0.521 to O.7OO within the 
same time period. The ER, however, does not show a clear 
cut increasing trend for the developed countries. For the 
group of less developed countries, the ratio decreased at 
first and then rose afterwards. There will be additional 
discussion on the behavior of these ratios with respect to 
individual countries below. In sum, developed countries.
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as a group, do have higher financial ratios than less devel­
oped countries--a rough indication that financial develop­
ment is positively related to economic development.
Next, we shall consider the result of a more rigorous 
method for analyzing the relationship between banking and 
economic development. Table 2 shows the result of the 
simple correlation analysis between the three-year averaged 
financial ratios and GiNP per capita for four different 
periods. All the correlation coefficients are positive, 
and, except for the 1969-71 CLR and the 1951-53 ER, all 
are significantly different from 0 at the 0.05 level.
TABLE 2
CORRELATION COEFFICIENT OF THREE-YEAR AVERAGED
FINANCIAL RATIOS AND GNP PER CAPITA
1951-53 1957-59 1963-65 1969-71
DDR 0.53831 0.59300 0.52400 0.53220
DTR 0.59646 0.51300 0.47400 0.42940
CLR 0.74936 0.49500 0.29800 0.18446
ER 0.53360 0.60290 0.53190 0.51690
Source: Computed from International Monetary Fund,
International Financial Statistics, Supple­
ment , 1972.
The regression equations of each of the financial ratios, 
with respect to the level of economic development, is 
given in Appendix III. The results indicate that no matter 
which indicator--DDR, DTR, CLR or ER--is used as a measure
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of financial development, it is positively correlated with 
the level of economic development. Furthermore, the degree 
and direction of this correlation has remained quite constant 
in the past two decades.
Let us test if there is any significant difference 
in the relationship between banking and economic develop­
ment when different financial ratios are used as indicators 
of financial development. A visual examination of the cor­
relation coefficient suggests that the association between 
financial and economic development is higher when the ER is 
used instead of the CLR as an indicator of financial devel­
opment. This is because three out of the four coefficients 
between ER and GNP per capita are higher than those between 
CLR and GNP per capita. That is, from Table 2 we can see 
that the correlation coefficients between ER and GNP per 
capita for 1957-59, 1963-65 and 1969-71 (0 .503, 0.532 and 
0.517, respectively) are higher than those for CLR (0 .495, 
0.298 and 0.185, respectively). As with DDR and DTR, the 
deviation is not as obvious. Actual tests of the signifi­
cance of differences between correlation coefficients reveal 
the following; While the correlation coefficient between 
ER and GNP per capita is higher than that between deposit 
and claim ratios, statistical tests of significance do not 
support the hypothesis that there is a significant differ­
ence in the correlation between banking and economic devel­
opment when different financial ratios are used as indicators
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of financial development. In other words, our tests of 
significance reveal that none of the correlation coefficients 
between ER and GNP per capita is statistically different 
from that of the others. The Fisher's Z transformation score 
for testing the difference between each pair of correlation 
coefficients is given in Appendix IV.
Additional tests to see if there is any significant 
difference in the relationship between banking and eco­
nomic development when different financial ratios are used 
as indicators of financial development were attempted. They 
are presented in Appendix IX- The results of these tests 
confirm that the three financial ratios perform equally 
well in indicating a country's level of financial and eco­
nomic development.
The results of the cross section and time series 
analyses of the trend of the financial ratios are shown in 
Tables 3 and k, respectively. Table 3 gives the averages 
of all the less developed countries' DDR, DTR, CLR and ER. 
For example, 0.45231 is the average of the fifty-five 
countries' DDR in 19&3 and 1.157 is the average of twenty- 
nine countries' ER for the period 19&9-71. First, let us 
look at the DDR column. The ratio increases gradually 
from 0.46 in 1951 to 0.47 in 1959 and falls down to 0.45 
between 1963-65i and then increases again in the period 
1969-71- Thus, we can argue from this cross section 
analysis that DDR does follow a roughly increasing trend
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TABLE 3
FINANCIAL RATIOS OF LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

































































Source; Computed from International Monetary Fund, Inter­
national Financial Statistics, Supplement, 1972.
TABLE 4
CORRELATION ANALYSIS OF FINANCIAL RATIOS AND TIME
--SELECTED COUNTRIES
(Correlation Coefficients)
Country DDR DTR CLR
Ecuador 0.896 0.941 0.722
Panama 0.201 0.600 0.899
Venezuela 0.896 0.913 0.687
Israel 0.496 0.935 0.616
Taiwan 0.848 0.765 0.987
Philippines 0.892 0.481 9.961
Source : Computed from International Monetary
Fund, International Financial Statistics , 
Supplement, 1972.
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in the past two decades. Column 2 in Table 3 shows very 
clearly that DTR has a strong positive relationship with 
time during the period under study. In fact, the ratio is 
monotonically increasing during the period of years 1951-71• 
With the exception of 1952 and 19&5, the CLR also follows 
a successively upward trend, as was expected. Unfortunately 
the ER dropped from 1.098 in 1951-53 to 0.864 in 1957-59i 
otherwise we will have an unambiguous increasing trend for 
the efficiency ratio.
A glance at Table 4 reveals that all the correla­
tion coefficients are positively correlated with time.
They are also significantly different from zero and we can 
conclude that within individual countries, the deposit and 
claim ratios tend to increase over time.
We have seen that the ER is positively correlated 
with the level of economic development, indicated by per 
capita GNP. One of our hypotheses suggested that the ER 
is also positively related to the rate of economic develop­
ment. Table 5 on page 82 shows that this hypothesis is 
statistically valid.
The correlation coefficient between ER and rate of 
growth of real GNP per capita is above 0.5 in all the 
periods. The t statistic shows that all the correlation 
coefficients are significantly different from zero with a 
95 percent confidence limit.
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TABLE 5
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EFFICIENCY 
RATIO AND GROWTH RATE




■ 1969-71 0.53140 3.2593
Source; Computed from International Monetary
Fund, International Financial Statistics , 
Supplement, 1972.
Let us now summarize the hypotheses and the findings 
of the tests on these hypotheses.
(1) Financial and economic development are posi­
tively related;
(2) the deposit and claim financial ratios are 
positively related to the level of development 
and have an increasing trend; and
(3) the efficiency ratio is positively related to 
the rate of economic development and it is a 
better indicator of financial development than 
the DDR, DTR and CLR.
The result of gross comparison between the developed 
and less developed countries, as two separate groups, indi­
cates that the developed countries do have higher financial 
ratios (Table 1). This encouraged us to go on to a more
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rigorous test for the relationship between financial and 
economic development.
Three-year averages of each of the financial ratios 
were used to correlate with GNP per capita (Table 2).
Except in two instances, all the correlation coefficients 
were found to be significantly positive. The two excep­
tions, though positive, were statistically insignificant. 
Nevertheless, the positive correlation coefficients indi­
cate that financial development is positively associated 
with economic development.
By examining the cross-section data of the financial 
ratios for the periods 1951-53, 1957-58, 1963-65 and I969-7I 
(Table 3), we can see that the deposit and claim ratios do 
follow an upward trend. The case for ER is not as obvious, 
though it increases consecutively in three out of four 
periods. The increasing trend of DDR, DTR and CLR was 
further confirmed by a time series analysis (Table 4). Six 
countries having continuous data for at least twenty years 
were arbitrarily chosen. By correlating the deposit and 
claim ratios with a time variable, results show that the 
ratios in each of the six countries chosen do increase over 
time.
The hypothesis that the efficiency ratio is a better 
indicator of economic development than the deposit or 
claim ratios cannot be accepted. A glance at Table 2 shows 
us that the correlation coefficients between each of the
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financial ratios and the level of economic development do 
not have any significant difference between each other 
statistically. However, it can be argued that the ER, 
though it cannot be accepted as performing better than the 
other ratios, is at least as good in terms of the associa­
tion with economic development. As to the relationship 
between the ER and the rate of economic development, Table 5 
reveals that a positive association exists.
Case Studies
The result of our statistical analysis does not
allow us to conclude that the efficiency ratio is a better
indicator of financial development than the deposit or 
claim ratios. However, it may be helpful if we examine 
the respective ratias of the individual countries. Appen­
dices V to VIII show the financial ratios of selected 
countries for the periods 1951-53, 1957-59, 1963-65 and 
1969-71 respectively. Note that the deposit and claim 
ratios are three-year averages for the given periods.
Let us review the countries which have deposit and
claim ratios as high as or higher than that of the developed
countries. In a given period, the ER of some of these 
countries is lower than that of the developed countries 
and sometimes this is true even when compared with the 
average of the less developed countries. For example, in 
1951-53, Argentina has a DDR of 0.486 which is as high as 
the average for the developed countries (O.509). But the
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corresponding ER is only 0.825 which is lower than that 
of the less developed countries (I.O98). Apparently this 
phenomenon is not due to chance because for most of the 
countries this happened in at least two out of the four 
periods considered. These countries include Argentina, Peru, 
Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Venezuela, Panama, Ceylon, Trinidad- 
Tobago and Cyprus. We shall look at some of these countries 
later in order to understand the economic implications 
behind this kind of observation.
If the deposit and claim ratios are good indicators 
of financial development, then those less developed coun­
tries having deposit and claim ratios as high as the devel­
oped countries should have a highly developed financial 
sector. The fact that those countries remain underdeveloped 
financially implies that there are certain circumstances 
under which these ratios do not represent the real situa­
tion. If so, the ER may be a better indicator than the 
deposit or claim ratio because under these particular cir­
cumstances the magnitude of the ER is within the domain in 
which a less developed country should be expected to lie.
That is, the ER magnitude is quite consistent with the coun­
try's level of financial development.
We may recall that in the discussion on the economic 
interpretation of the ER, we suggested that the ER is 
superior to the other financial ratios in cases of chronic 
inflation or deflation. During an inflationary period, the
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money stock and prices are rising. To carry out a given 
volume of transaction more money will be required than 
before because of higher prices. People have to put more 
money in their checking accounts in order to carry out their 
day to day transactions. As discussed before, because of 
convenience or pecuniary return, the rate of increase in 
demand deposit may be higher than that of cash and conse­
quently the DDR may rise. The redistribution of income 
vis-a-vis inflation may also raise the DTR. Hence in a 
chronic inflation, the DDR and DTR tend to be high. Notice 
that we are only concerned with mild or intermediate infla­
tion and the above may not be true with respect to a hyper­
inflation.
At the beginning of an inflationary period when 
business activity starts to become more dynamic, business 
and industry will try to borrow more from the commercial 
banks. The claims on the private sector will therefore 
tend to increase at a faster pace than gross national product. 
Thus, the claim ratio will tend to rise. As government 
starts to put on the brakes, credit will become tighter 
and the rate of growth of claims will decrease. Hence, the 
claims on the private sector will tend to increase at a 
slower rate or even decrease absolutely. The CLR though 
starting out with a high level will either increase at a 
slower rate or may even decline.
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If we look at the DDR or CLR of a given year when 
the country is experiencing inflation, the ratios will 
lead us to conclude that the country is developed finan­
cially. However, the high DDR and CLR is a consequence of 
inflation rather than, say, an improvement in banking 
services or a change in the people's habits toward using 
banks more frequently. If the inflation is short-lived, 
then we can resolve the problem of mis-indication by aver­
aging the ratios over a period of time--i.e. by eliminating
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the cyclical effect. Any extreme values can be smoothed
out and the ratios will continue to be valid indicators of 
financial development. In the case of chronic inflation, 
however, even by averaging the ratios for a short period of 
time (or by eliminating the cyclical effect) will still 
leave the ratios as misleading indicators as they will con­
tinue to be influenced by the inflationary effects.
Let us now take up a few countries and see if the 
above argument is valid. Since most of the countries having 
"high” DDR and CLR but "low" ER are Latin American coun­
tries, we shall concentrate on five of them--namely Argentina, 
Brazil, Peru, Chile and C o l o m b i a . E a c h  country's economic 
and institutional background will be presented first fol­
lowed by a discussion on the behavior of the financial 
ratios. The main source of information on the individual 
countries is from the Economic Reports of the U.S. Department 
of Commerce and the Economic Survey of Latin America pub­
lished by the United Nations.
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Argentina
Argentina has been a large-scale producer of sur­
plus agricultural and livestock commodities. The economy 
is virtually self-sufficient in the production and processing 
of foodstuffs and has steadily become more diversified 
since the 1950's* There was a high degree of government 
intervention in the national economy during the early 1950's. 
Official action extends, to some degree, into almost all 
fields of business and industrial activity. The government 
owns the country's railway system, airlines, grain elevators 
and many other enterprises. However, the great majority of 
industry and domestic commerce is still in the hands of 
private entrepreneurs.
The banking system includes a central bank, banks 
owned by the Federal Government, banks owned completely or 
partially by Provincial or Municipal Government, private 
banks and non-bank financial institutions. In 1946, the 
banking system was nationalized. All deposits were trans­
ferred to and guaranteed by the Central Bank. The latter 
also determined the loan policies of the banks. Commercial 
banks, acting from then on were mere agents of the Central 
Bank. All banking expenses incurred in the handling of 
deposit accounts, including interest payments, were to be 
paid by the Central Bank. The nationalization of the banks 
and the government's guarantee of the deposits with the 
commercial banks might have given depositors some confidence
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on the banking system. This together with the high rate of 
inflation in the early fifties may account for the "high" 
deposit ratio. Credit policy, though mainly determined by 
the Central Bank, remained liberal before inflation was out 
of control in 1952. New loans granted by the banking system 
to the private sector was at a peak of 6,906 million pesos 
in 1951 as can be seen from the table on the next page.
Even just before the introduction of the austerity program 
in late 1952, the amount of new loans granted continued to 
be large. This kind of liberal policy may be one of the 
reasons for the "high" CLR during the period 1951-53. Infla­
tion was at a rate of 39 percent per annum in 1952.^^ A 
heavy external deficit due to excess of imports caused by 
the expectation of future shortages resulted in a severe 
drain on Argentina's international reserves. Consequently, 
an austerity program was launched to curb the high rate of 
price increase. Many different methods of credit restric­
tion were i n t r o d u c e d . F o r  example, private concerns 
requesting loans had to supply special property statements 
to justify the loan. Documentation for refusing credit, 
which had to be presented to the Central Bank in the past, 
was no longer required from the commercial banks. The 
effect of this severe credit restriction can clearly be 
seen in Table 6. New loans granted to the private sector in 
1953 decreased significantly. In fact, some loans were 
recalled in the first quarter of the year. This rapid
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TABLE 6
VARIATIONS IN LOANS GRANTED TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
BY THE BANKING SYSTEM OF ARGENTINA















Source; Computed from United Nations, Economic 
Survey of Latin America, 1953 , p.
contraction evidently lowered the dCL/dDD component of the 
ER. The "low" ER was mainly a result of the tight monetary 
policy. Commercial banks, under the direct control of the 
central bank, curtailed their loans to the private sector
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after 1952. While deposits, especially demand deposits 
were at a high level, because people tend to keep adequate 
liquid assets so that they can transfer them to commodities 
should the value of money decline precipitously, the increase 
in loans to the private sector per unit of deposit dropped 
substantially, leaving the ER at a "low" level.
The austerity program introduced in 1952 was suc­
cessful. The rate of inflation dropped from 39 percent in 
1952 to only k percent in 1954. The improvement in the 
balance of payments, the stabilization of the cost-of-living 
index and the need to provide a fresh impulse to the coun­
try's economy induced authorities to relax credit restraints 
and adopt a more liberal policy once again. During 1957, 
according to Raul Prebish's Economic Recovery Plan, commer­
cial banks were " l i b e r a t e d . D e p o s i t s  were returned to 
the private sector in that year, but they continued to be 
guaranteed, in the sense that the Central bank was ready to 
advance the required funds to pay for all deposits in the 
case of a bank failure. Laws were established to provide 
for minimum gold and foreign exchange reserve requirements 
for the Central Bank and the convertibility of the Bank's 
own currency. However, these provisions have never been 
enforced. Credit to the public sector remained high as a 
result of the loose control. Starting from 1955 the rate 
of inflation began to creep up again. It was announced in 
late 1958, that in order to check the incidence of credit
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expansion, the minimum cash holdings of commercial banks 
had to be raised from 25 to 60 percent of their deposits
69and sight obligations.  ^ Consequently, many banks tempo­
rarily suspended the granting of new loans for construc­
tion which was a blow to the real estate industry. The 
high reserve ratio of 60 percent may be a major reason for 
the "low” ER. A large proportion of the increase in bank 
deposits had to be kept in the banks' vault or with the 
Central Bank in order to meet the reserve requirement thereby 
lowering the dCL/dDD factor of the ER. It was not until 
1963 when the country was in the hands of a different politi­
cal party and through persistent pressures from both the 
official and private sectors that the Central Bank eased 
the tight monetary control to some extent.
The table below shows the different financial ratios 
of Argentina. The country has been experiencing a chronic 
intermediate inflation in the last two decades. Its "high" 
DDR and CLR plus the "low" ER clearly fits into our theoreti­
cal argument that the ER is a better indicator of financial 
development. In fact, intermediation inefficiency due to 
tight monetary control has induced the "high" CLR to decline 
through time.
Brazil
Brazil has had a long-term history of inflation.
In moving within a relatively short period of time from a
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TABLE 7
FINANCIAL RATIOS OF ARGENTINA (1951-1965)
Period DDR DTK CLR ER
1951-53 0.486 0.615 0.218 0.825
1957-59 0.498 0.616 0.173 0.835
1963-65 0.493 0.592 0.129 0.879
Source; Computed from International Monetary 
Fund, International Financial Statis­
tics , Supplement, 1972.
predominantly export-import economy to a producer of most 
of its consumer goods (and more and more of its capital 
goods), the country has been faced with problems of internal 
and external instability. Especially in the fifties and 
the early sixties, the rate of inflation has increased owing 
largely to the financing of sizable Government deficits. 
Chronic deficits on the current account in the balance of 
payments have occurred due to the excess of imports (to 
develop the infra-structure of the economy and to promote 
industrialization) over exports. Nevertheless, the rate of 
inflation in Brazil was not as high as that of Argentina.
The special nature of the financial and banking 
structure of the country should not be neglected in con­
sidering inflation in Brazil. Up to I965 there was no 
central bank in Brazil. However, many of the functions of 
a central banking institution were performed by the Bank of 
Brazil which was also the country's largest commercial
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bank. The banking system which existed in the 1950's was 
itself expansionary. "The Treasury could have recourse to 
the direct paper issues or loans of the "central bank," 
cancelling the latter by the former, which in turn allowed 
the bank to liquidate its debts with the Rediscount Depart­
ment.
It follows that any deflationary measure, which 
resulted in a rise in the cash assets of the "central bank" 
or the Bank of Brazil would enable the Bank to expand credit. 
This was rational when we consider that the "central bank" 
was also a commercial bank. Under these situations, there 
is little room for the use of traditional monetary policy.
The use of the discount or interest rate as a tool of mone­
tary control was very limited as the smaller commercial 
banks took permanent recourse to rediscount while the large 
banks did so merely in case of emergencies. Thus, monetary 
authorities were obliged to provide funds to the banks 
whenever they were in trouble. The use of minimum cash 
requirements was nonoperational as the high interest rate 
on deposits kept the banks from holding excess cash balances. 
Hence, in the early 1950's monetary authority was largely 
helpless to deal with the excessive monetary expansion.
A decisive step was taken by the Superintendent of 
Money and Credit in 1953 to restructure the banking system. 
The rediscount rate was increased and interest on time 
deposits was restricted to a 5 percent maximum. Credit to
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the public sector continued to be high despite the restric­
tive policy.
1957 was a good year for coffee with increased foreign 
exchange earnings and savings. Aggregate private investment 
did not increase much, however, as the extra earnings from 
coffee went mainly to the hands of the coffee brokers or 
middlemen. Savings were thus accumulated in bank deposits 
with only a slight rise in advances to the public. The 
main change in the balance sheet of the commercial banks 
was a large increase in deposits with the Bank of Brazil 
and bank reserve ratios rose steeply by the end of 1957 
which continued through 1959. The lack of marketing ability 
(or lack of market) for loans on the part of the commercial 
banks resulted in having a large proportion of deposits as 
excess reserves. This evidently has had a negative effect 
on dCL/dDD resulting in a "low" ER.
A central bank was officially established in 19^4 
to assume the functions previously carried out by the Bank 
of Brazil. Strengthening of the banking system was called 
for. The number of banks was reduced through mergers and 
many small banks were either merged or closed down. During 
1964 the rate of inflation was the highest in the last 
twenty year period, as can be seen from Table 8 below.
Unfortunately, lack of information on the type of 
monetary policy pursued in this period does not allow us to 
comment on the financial ratios. In sum, like the case of 
Argentina, Brazil's chronic inflation rendered the DDR and
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TABLE 8
BRAZIL--RATE OF INFLATION (1951-1970)























Source: Felipe Pazos, Chronic Infla­




CLR to have high values while the ER continues to indicate 
the real level of the country's financial development. The 
following table shows the financial ratios of Brazil:
TABLE 9
FINANCIAL RATIOS OF BRAZIL (1951-71)
Period DDR DTR CLR ER
1951-53 0 . 566 0.599 0.179 1.019
1957-59 0.619 0.633 0.135 0.850
1963-65 0.616 0.620 0.105 0.946
1969-71 0.625 0.653 0.147 1.071
Source: Computed from International Monetary Fund,
International Financial Statistics, Sup­
plement, 1972.
Colombia
Since the end of the Second World War, the rate of 
economic growth of Colombia has been rather high. Agricul­
ture has not only been the main source of Colombia's 
national income, but it also has supplied most of the coun­
try's food requirements and has accounted for over 80 per­
cent of the country's foreign exchange earnings. Beginning 
in 19^51 the pace of inflation began to creep up due to 
heavy public expenditures. By 1950 the rate of inflation 
seemed to be slowing down. At the end of that year, by 
agreement with all components of the banking system, it 
was decided to maintain loans at figures not exceeding
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credit at the end of September. This restriction remained
in force until the end of 1951* Between 1951 and 1953
though monetary policy was mainly restrictive, the central
bank was careful in not distorting the pace of financial
development. Changes in cash reserve minimum requirements
were made often enough to meet loans demand from the private
sector. Thus, the 1951-53 period did have a close to
"average” ER though the deposit ratio was as high as that
of the developed countries. Prices began to shoot up again
between 1955 and 1958 due to expansion in the finance of
coffee stocks. Loans to the private sector were among the
most rapidly increasing item between 195^ and 1957- In
March 1958 , the compulsory cash reserve was raised from
19 to 20 percent and from 9 to 11 percent for sight and
time deposits respectively. The reserve requirement for
demand deposit was increased to 23 percent. The maintenance
of a reserve amounting to nearly 100 percent of the increase
in sight and time deposits in relation to cash balances
held at the beginning of 1958 was imposed at the end of
that year. Thus, despite the increment of increase registered
in demand deposits during the 1957-59 period, loans to the
71private sector increased by barely 3 percent. This explains 
why the ER in this period suddenly dropped to 0.3. Again, 
what was true with respect to the other two countries studied 
above seems to be also true for Colombia.
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TABLE 10
FINANCIAL RATIOS OF COLOMBIA (1951-65)
Period DDR DTR CLR ER
1951-53 0.527 0.571 0.092 1.023
1957-59 0.566 0.591 0.II4 0.373
1963-65 0.600 0.690 0.I2I 1.017








Peru has attracted some attention after the Second 
World War through its successful policy in developing the 
economy. Basically an agricultural country, Peru was able 
to have a more diversified combination of exports than many 
other Latin American countries.
The banking system of Peru is made up of the Central 
Reserve Bank, which is the Central Bank, thirteen commercial 
banks and three development banks. General prices increased 
quite rapidly in the late forties, mainly as a result of 
upward fluctuations in prices of imports. Policies were 
introduced in the early fifties to correct the disequilibrium 
in the trade balance and to maintain monetary stability. 
Unfortunately, these policies were not very successful 
though the trade imbalance and inflation would probably 
have been worse if the government did not step in on time.
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During March 1951i the commercial banks were required to 
deposit additional cash reserves in the Central Bank. This 
did not have too much effect on the commercial banks as 
many banks as a matter of practice, did not observe the 
reserve requirement. Despite the introduction of the tight 
monetary policy, the cost of living index rose by 9*1 per­
cent between 1952 and 1953. The credit situation was eased 
somewhat due to an improvement in the balance of payments 
during the last half of 1953. Thus, we have in the 1951-53 
period, a rather high ER.
Beginning in 1955, deficit financing was used con­
tinuously by the government. Commercial banks' short term 
advances to the Treasury rose steadily. A new method of 
computing the reserve requirement of the commercial banks 
was introduced in 1957. Many banks which did not observe 
the reserve requirement previously were forced to keep 
their additional deposits as reserves due to the more 
stringent requirements imposed by the Central Bank. This 
may explain the sudden drop in the ER during the 1957-59 
period as the commercial banks had to replenish their 
required reserves from in-coming deposits, thereby lowering 
the dCL/dDD component of the ER.
The rate of inflation rose again in 19^2 due to 
heavy government expenditure--the latter was mainly spent 
on improving the country's infrastructure. Government 
expenditure increased by 15 percent in I963. Though credit
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to the private sector was restricted, the heavy government 
deficits continued to keep the deposit ratio at a "high" 
level while maintaining a "low" ER.
Chile
Despite a low rate of growth in the fifties, many
basic changes have occurred in the structure of the Chilean 
72economy. Agriculture is still the principal activity of 
the Chilean people but it is no longer the principal source 
of income. Mining has declined in importance in the late 
fifties though it is still the principal source of govern­
ment income and accounts for over half of the value of 
exports. Chile has a large public sector and the role of 
the government is becoming increasingly more important.
The Chilean banking system consists of the Central 
Bank, two development banks, about thirty commercial banks, 
the State Bank of Chile, and two mortgage credit institu­
tions. The Central Bank also engages in general commercial 
banking activities. A large part of the Bank's portfolio 
consists of loans to the Government. As in the case of 
Brazil, the banking system followed an expansionary policy 
in the fifties. Severe inflation in the fifties resulted
in sharp increases in the price index, and a steady depre-
73ciation of the Chilean peso. In order to prevent infla­
tion from becoming a hyper-inflation, an economic stabiliza-
7^
tion program was undertaken by the government. One of
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the major items of the program was a strict system of 
credit controls which created a tight condition in the 
money market. Quotas were imposed on commercial banks to 
limit their amount of monthly credit expansion. In addi­
tion, a strict rediscount policy was followed by the Central 
Bank. For example, the rediscount rate rose sharply for 
loans of commercial banks exceeding half of a bank's capital 
and reserves. These measures, together with high reserve 
requirements were the principal credit controls till the 
early sixties. The effect of the stabilization program can 
be seen through the "low" ER as tight monetary control 
lowered the dCL/dDD in the ER.
Although the stabilization program did have some
effect in restricting credit to the private sector, public
expenditure and especially credit to the public sector
remained very high. This is so because special legislation
periodically authorized and even expanded the Treasury's
capacity to borrow from the banking system. For instance.
Towards the end of 195^ a new device was added to those 
at the government's disposal. It was empowered to make 
temporary use of the frozen funds represented by prior 
deposits on imports, and cover them with Treasury notes 
in dollars.75
As a result of the high government expenditure, the 
commercial banks' deposits greatly exceeded that of credit 
to the private sector. Hence, we can see that the deposit 
ratio in the periods 1957-59 and I963-65 were "high" while 
the ER remained "low." Furthermore, high interest rates
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were paid on time deposits as the monetary authority wished 
to attract long-term deposits. This resulted in a substan­
tial increase in the contribution of quasi-money to the 
total means of payment as is revealed by the high DTR in 
the sixties.
A new banking and credit policy was announced by 
the President of Chile at the end of 1970. All private 
banks were "nationalized." Privately owned commercial bank 
shares, which were voluntarily sold by the owners were 
purchased by the Government. One of the objectives of the 
new policy was "to increase the number of people that use 
banking and financial facilities." Credit control was 
eased to some extent. The ER, though increased to 0.884 
in the 19&9-71 period continued to be "low" while the deposit 
ratio remained "high." Notice that the CLR has a decreasing 
trend as the dCL/dDD factor in the ER was continuously kept 
at a "low" level. Table 11 shows the financial ratios in 
Chile from 1957 to 1971.
TABLE 11
FINANCIAL RATIOS OF CHILE (1957-71)
Period DDR DTR CLR ER
1957-59 0.574 0.432 0.183 0.855
1963-65 0.592 0.649 0.110 0.800
1969-71 0.598 0.609 0.089 0.884
Source; Computed from International Monetary Fund, 
International Financial Statistics, Supple­
ment, 1972.
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In conclusion, we can see that a general pattern 
exists in the five countries we have just examined. Though 
information is mainly limited to the 1950's and early 
1960's, enough can be found to draw some conclusions on 
the relative merits of the ER. The long period of infla­
tion in these countries has kept their DDR and CLR "high."
As monetary policy was active in combating the expansionary 
forces, the dCL/dDD component in the ER was kept down 
throughout the period under study, thereby eliminating 
the mis-indication problem that prevails in the DDR and CLR. 
Consequently, during periods of chronic inflation as experi­
enced by the five countries briefly examined above the ER 
offers some advantages in measuring financial development.
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Economic development is a long run process that is 
multidimensional and involves changes in structure, capacity 
and output. The subject is commonly discussed in terms of 
output, income and wealth. The emphasis on this "real 
aspect" of development in the literature often ignores the 
"financial aspect" of economic development.
Besides the central bank, the commercial bank is 
the main financial institution in the financial sector of 
many less developed countries. A major role of the commer­
cial banking system in the development process is financial 
intermediation--mobilizing savings and allocating them among 
competing sectors in the growing economy. The more effi­
cient this intermediation process is, the less wasted finan­
cial resources are, eind, hence, the more rapid the economic 
development may be. The purpose of this study is to formu­
late an indicator of financial development and to investi­
gate the association between financial and economic develop­
ment. One of the major questions this study attempts to 
answer is whether financial and economic development are 
positively associated or not. If the answer is affirmative,
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then government authorities may want to include the develop­
ment of the financial sector as one of their objectives for 
achieving economic development. Parallel to this, a coun­
try's degree of development in the financial sector can 
also be used as an indicator of its level of economic devel­
opment .
Empirical research on the topic of finance and eco­
nomic development is not abundant. Among the few economists 
who have written in this area are Goldsmith, Adelman, Morris, 
U Tun Wai and McKinnon. McKinnon's view on money and capi­
tal in economic development is especially thought-provoking.
A review of common characteristics of financial markets in 
the less developed countries suggests that organized and 
unorganized money markets co-exist in less developed coun­
tries. In the organized money market the commercial bank 
is the leading private institution. Many commercial banking 
systems in less developed countries are dominated by foreign 
banks whose interest quite often conflicts with that of the 
less developed countries. The local banks, which are usually 
conservative and risk averting, have to operate on whatever 
business is left over from the foreign banks. Imperfection 
is the key feature in unorganized money markets. Partici­
pants in this market include people from all walks of life. 
The prevailing interest rates are usually very high. Neo­
classical economists, neglecting the imperfections in the 
unorganized financial markets, treat money and physical
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capital as substitutes in the asset holders' portfolios.
This renders inappropriate their prescription for increasing 
less developed countries' capital accumulation. McKinnon, 
on the other hand, argues that capital and cash balances 
are compliments in the asset holders' portfolio when the 
imperfection of financial markets are taken into considera­
tion. Thus, according to McKinnon, in order to escape from 
financial repression, less developed countries should increase 
the real rates of interest so as to induce a higher rate of 
capital accumulation.
To investigate the relationship between financial 
and economic development, three indicators on banking devel­
opment were presented. They were the deposit ratio, the 
claim ratio, CLR; and, the efficiency ratio, ER. With the 
exception of the ER, which is formulated by the present 
writer, all the other ratios have been used in the litera­
ture before.
Basing on the narrow or broad definition of money 
the deposit ratio can have two versions. First, the demand 
deposit ratio, DDR, which is the ratio of the commercial 
bank's demand deposit to money supply M^. Second, the demand, 
time and savings deposit ratio, the DTR, which is the ratio 
of demand, time and savings deposits to money supply M^.
CLR is the proportion of commercial banks' claim on the 
private sector in GNP, The ER is defined as the percentage 
change in claim to the percentage change in total deposits
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of commercial banks. Each of these financial ratios 
reflects an aspect of financial development. The deposit 
ratio looks at the banking sector from the liability side, 
while the claim ratio approaches it from the asset side of 
the balance sheet. The ER reveals how efficient the com­
mercial banking system is in performing its intermediation 
function.
It was hypothesized that each of these financial 
ratios, being an indicator of financial development, is 
positively associated with economic development, which is 
measured by per capita GNP. In addition, it was hypothesized 
that each ratio has an increasing trend and that the ER 
has a higher degree of association with the level of eco­
nomic development than the deposit and claim ratios.
Statistics on sixty less developed and fourteen 
developed countries from 1951 to 1971 were collected from 
International Monetary Fund Publications. A gross compari­
son of the less developed countries and developed countries, 
as two distinct groups, was first performed. Each country's 
financial ratios were calculated for the years 1951, 1957, 
1963 and 1971. The efficiency ratio was computed for three- 
year periods--1951“53, 1957-59, 1963-65 and 1969-71. F or a 
particular ratio in a given year, averages of developed and 
less developed countries, as two distinct groups, were taken. 
For instance, with respect to the DDR in 1963 (14 developed 
and 55 less developed countries were included), an average
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of the foui'loon DDR's of developed countries was obtained. 
This average constituted the DDR of the developed countries 
as a group in 1963» Similarly, an average of the fifty-five 
DDR's of the less developed countries was computed and it 
formed the DDR of these countries. The same procedure was 
carried out for other financial ratios and for other years. 
The results were presented in Table 1. We can see from 
this table that no matter which the period is, less devel­
oped countries, as a group, have lower financial ratios than 
the developed countries.
Next, correlation analysis was performed to test 
the relationship between financial and economic development 
more rigorously. Three-year averages of the less developed 
countries' financial ratios and GNP per capita were taken 
for the same periods of years mentioned above. Correlation 
analysis between the three-year averaged financial ratios 
and GNP per capita revealed that each ratio is positively 
associated with the level of economic development. That 
is, countries with a low GNP per capita also have low finan­
cial ratios. A look at the average of the three-year 
averaged ratios led us to conclude that, in general, each 
ratio tends to increase over time. Six countries were 
selected to perform time series analysis on their financial 
ratios. For a particular country, its annual DDR, DTR and 
CLR from 1951 to 1971 were used to correlate with time, 
respectively. This time series analysis confirms the
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hypothesis that the financial ratios have an increasing 
trend.
Though the result of the statistical analysis does 
not allow us to conclude that the ER is clearly a better 
indicator of financial development, we were able to demon­
strate that under certain circumstances the deposit and 
claim ratios are misleading while the ER remains a more 
valid indicator of financial development. Studies on five 
Latin American countries substantiated this point.
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REGRESSION EQUATIONS OF THREE-YEAR AVERAGED 
FINANCIAL RATIOS AND GNP PER CAPITA
1951-53
GNP Per Capita = - 531 + 1967 DDR
GNP Per Capita = - 779 + 2222 DTR
GNP Per Capita = 13 + 4o6l CLR
GNP Per Capita = 128 + 65 ER
1957-59
GNP Per Capita = - 157 + 980 DDR
GNP Per Capita = - 122 + 780 DTR
GNP Per Capita = 86 + 2140 CLR
GNP Per Capita = 187 + 62 ER
1963-65
GNP Per Capita = - 91 + 895 DDR
GNP Per Capita = - 84 + 708 DTR
GNP Per Capita = 187 + 957 CLR
GNP Per Capita = 114 + 192 ER
1969-71
GNP Per Capita = - 250 + 1407 DDR
GNP Per Capita = - 315 + 1175 DTR
GNP Per Capita = 364 + 546 CLR
GNP Per Capita — - 38 + 408 ER
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APPENDIX IV
Z SCORE FOR TESTING THE SUPERIORITY 
OF THE EFFICIENCY RATIO
Category 1951-1953 1957-1959 1963-1965 1969-1971
DDR -0.01225 -0.36280 -0.67585 -0.0767
DTR -0.17144 -0.03825 0.30501 0.4104
CLR -0.69773 0.02956 1.12242 1.4008
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APPENDIX V
FINANCIAL RATIOS OF SELECTED LESS 
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES (1951-1953)
Country DDR DTR CLR ER
Argentina 0.486 0.615 0.218 0.825
Bolivia 0.311 0.318 0.024 0.231
Brazil 0.566 0.599 0.179 1.019
Ceylon 0.599 0.638 0.144 0.177
Colombia 0.527 0.571 0.092 1.023
Costa Rica 0.522 0.564 0.002 1.436
Dominican Republic 0.535 0.597 0.054 1.257
Ecuador 0.415 0.472 0.083 1.056
Guatemala 0.298 0.368 0.044 0.451
Panama 0.552 0.623 0.142 0.980
Peru 0.546 0.649 0.135 1.211
Philippines 0.405 0.563 0.090 1.081
Thailand 0.260 0.316 0,047 0.637
Trinidad-Tobago 0.540 0.557 0.162 0.283
Venezuela 0.511 0.574 0.088 0.906
Less developed 
countries 0.466 0.524 0.091 1.098
Developed countries 0.509 0.629 0.286 1.469
Source; Computed from International Monetary Fund, Inter­
national Financial Statistics, Supplement, 1972.
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APPENDIX VI
FINANCIAL RATIOS OF SELECTED LESS 
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES (1957-1959)
Country DDR DTR CLR ER
Argentina 0.498 0.616 0.173 0.835
Bolivia 0.198 0.204 0.021 0.721
Brazil 0.619 0.633 0.135 0.850
Ceylon 0.530 0.618 0.073 0.372
Chile 0.574 0.432 0.183 0.855
Colombia 0.566 0.591 0.114 0.373
Dominican Republic 0.486 0.636 0.094 0.898
Ecuador 0.439 0.499 0.134 0.640
Ghana 0.347 0.410 0.026 0.556
Guatemala 0.407 0.505 0.070 0.749
Guyana 0.442 0.564 0.087 0.915
Honduras 0.371 0.470 0.047 0.971
Iraq 0.327 0.453 0.092 0.644
J amaica 0.721 0.856 0.143 2.890
Korea 0.380 0.447 0.073 0.788
Malaysia 0.323 0.420 0.065 0.792
Mexico 0.494 0.479 0.047 0. 500
Nicaragua 0.496 0.533 0.165 0.822
Panama 0.612 0.512 0.085 0.905
Peru 0.559 0.669 0.137 0.365
Philippines 0.448 0.639 0.124 0.782
Sudan 0.461 0.462 0.075 0.154
Taiwan 0.431 0.566 0.075 1.096
Thailand 0.333 0.445 0.090 1.032
Trinidad-Tobago 0.705 0.846 0.171 0.766
Venezuela 0.638 0.754 0.185 0.978
Less developed 
countries 0.473 0.550 0.103 0.864
Developed countries 0.500 0.661 0.302 0.920
Source; Computed from: International Monetary Fund, Inter­
national Financial Statistics, Supplement, 1972.
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APPENDIX VII
FINANCIAL RATIOS OF SELECTED LESS 
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES (1963-1965)
Country DDR DTR CLR ER
Argentina 0.493 0.593 0.129 0.879
Bolivia 0.183 0.211 0.034 0.832
Brazil 0 . 6l6 0.620 0.105 0.946
Cameroon 0.423 0.482 0.154 0.457
Ceylon 0.459 0.588 0.089 0.333
Chile 0.592 0.649 0.110 0.800
Colombia 0.600 0.690 0.121 1.017
Costa Rica 0.592 0.652 0.216 1.237
Cyprus 0.521 0.630 0.362 0.464
Dominican Republic 0.434 0.546 0.066 0.898
Ecuador 0.479 0.527 0.135 0.918
Egypt 0.319 0.442 0.169 0.521
El Salvador 0.485 0.698 0.210 0.867
Ghana 0.461 0.567 0.070 1.025
Guatemala 0.4o6 0.575 0.094 0.922
Guyana 0.414 0.716 0.099 0.304
Honduras 0.445 0.609 0.073 1.170
India 0.303 0.480 0.011 1.098
Iran 0.462 0.647 0.158 0.870
Iraq 0.229 0.407 0.097 0.527
Israel 0 .66o 0.729 0.199 1.260
Ivory Coast 0.392 0.467 0.184 0.324
Jamaica 0.649 0.859 0.173 1.503
Korea 0.529 0.646 0.093 0.571
Malaysia 0.430 0.637 0.130 0.944
Mauritius 0.564 0.649 0.154 1.023
Mexico 0.544 0.570 0.060 1.589
Morocco 0.483 0.511 0.130 0.093
Nicaragua 0.594 0.645 0.153 0.777
Nigeria 0.369 0.534 0.076 0.825
Pakistan 0.369 0.517 0.114 0.633
Panama 0.657 0.576 0.142 1.020




Country DDR DTR CLR ER
Philippines 0.460 0.716 0.192 1.235
Sierra Leone 0.333 0.496 0.064 0.800
Singapore 0.491 0.721 0.367 1.895
Sudan 0.410 0.450 0.113 1.002
Syria 0.197 0.231 0.211 0.610
Senegal 0.409 0.428 0.109 0.257
Taiwan 0.606 0.786 0.175 1.407
Thailand 0.418 0.638 0.140 1.072
Trinidad-Tobago 0.691 0.860 0.101 1.029
Tunisia 0.609 0.662 0.290 1.860
Uruguay 0.266 0.399 0.194 0.890
Venezuela 0.647 0.778 0.162 1.020
Vietnam 0.287 0.332 0.064 0.160
Less developed
countries 0.455 0.567 0.135 1.019
Developed countries 0.555 0.724 0.381 1.191
Source: Computed from International Monetary Fund, Inter­
national Financial Statistics, Supplement, 1972.
APPENDIX VIII
FINANCIAL RATIOS OF SELECTED LESS 
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES (1969-1971)
Country DDR DTR CLR ER
Bolivia 0.235 0.370 0.058 0.864
Brazil 0.625 0.653 0.147 1.071
Chile 0.598 0.609 0.089 0.884
Costa Rica 0.662 0.712 0.200 0.843
Cyprus 0.548 0.645 0.383 0.646
Dominican Republic 0.534 0.620 0.122 0.875
Ecuador 0.551 0.562 0.136 0.669
Egypt 0.334 0.462 0.139 1.134
El Salvador 0.514 0.748 0.224 0.894
Ethiopia 0.254 0.479 0.089 1.065
Gambia 0.246 0.363 0.175 1.140
Guatemala 0.426 0.507 0.123 0.467
Guyana 0.381 0.771 0.159 0.913
Honduras 0.484 0.619 0.166 0.761
Indonesia 0.337 0.511 0.090 1.006
Iraq 0.202 0.312 0.702 1.288
Ivory Coast 0.487 0.603 0.226 1.174
Jamaica 0.647 0.881 0.293 0.813
Kenya 0.695 0.789 0.154 1.214
Korea 0.588 0.853 0.339 1.221
Libya 0.314 0.329 0.076 0.495
Malawi 0.581 0.651 0.100 1.032
Malaysia 0.470 0.536 0.190 1.033
Mauritius 0.533 0.635 0.219 1.045
Mexico 0.586 0.631 0.069 1.134
Morocco 0.484 0.522 0.129 0.761
Panama 0.753 0.744 0.323 1.143
Paraguay 0.393 0.661 0.107 0,854
Philippines 0.499 0.676 0.205 1.116
Singapore 0.549 0.805 0.432 1.317
Taiwan 0.623 0.756 0.289 1.451
Tanzania 0.574 0.663 0,. 094 0.406
Thailand 0.363 0.433 0.197 0.972
Tunisia 0.615 0.698 0.389 0.576
Uruguay 0.208 0.311 0.078 0.966
Venezuela 0.679 0.809 0.198 1.070
Less developed 
countries 0.522 0.680 0.201 1.157
Developed countries 0.603 0.800 0.453 1.161
Source: Computed from International Monetary Fund, Inter­
national Financial Statistics, Supplement, 1972.
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APPENDIX IX
The result of our simple correlation analysis shows 
that there is no significant difference in the relationship 
between banking and economic development when different 
financial ratios eire used as indicators of financial develop­
ment. A multiple correlation analysis was used in an 
attempt to cross-check this result. Instead of correlating 
GNP per capita with each of the financial ratios, the former 
was used to correlate with the efficiency ratio and the 
deposit ratios. The seune is done with respect to the growth 
rate, i.e. the rate of change of real GNP. If the ER is a 
better indicator of financial development than the other 
financial ratios, then we would expect that the multiple 
correlation coefficient between GNP per capita (or growth 
rate) and the ER and the deposit ratio will be significantly 
higher than the simple correlation coefficient between GNP 
per capita (or growth rate) and the deposit ratio alone.
The table below gives the results of the correlation analysis 
for the period 19&3-65.
2
It is clear from the table that we have a higher R 
whenever the ER is used as an additional explanatory variable 
However statistical test of significance reveals that the 
explanatory power of the additional ER is statistically 
insignificant. Hence we cannot conclude that the degree 
of association between banking and economic development is
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higher when the ER is used instead of other financial 
ratios as an indicator of financial development.
RESULTS OF THE CORRELATION ANALYSIS
Dependent Variable Independent Variable R%
GNP per capita DDR 0.2946
GNP per capita DDR + ER 0.3415
GNP j)er capita DTR 0.2762
GNP per capita DTR , ER 0.3315
Growth rate i;DR 0.1537
Growth rate DDR + ER 0.2705
Growth rate i;TR 0.2005
Growth rate D'i'lc -!- ER 0.2964
Source: Computed from li. (■ .-national Monetary
B'und, Interna t.i o..ii Financial Statistics,
1972.
